

Dear colleagues,

Thank you so much for your attention at the Hot Politics Lab.

My research focusses on how intersections of race, religion and gender shape the expectations and experiences of representation among individual citizens. Through conducting survey experiments with an oversample of the largest minority groups in the Netherlands, Germany and France I analyze the relationship between citizen and politician using an intersectional framework. Not only do I analyze the intersections between race, religion and gender, I also analyze how socio-economic (income inequality and green energy) and socio-cultural statements (gender equality, sexuality, immigration, Islam) influence the ways in which gender, race and religion are perceived. My main research question is: How do intersections of race, religion and gender influence expectations and experiences of representation amongst individual citizens in France, Germany and the Netherlands? Most importantly, I want to know: do citizens care that representatives look like them?

I am going to gather data in France, Germany and the Netherlands in March. Before that I want to pre-register all of my hypotheses, which you can find in page 2 to 5. I also want to preregister all of my R-code as well, because I'm very dedicated to ensuring no p-hacking has taken place. However, I know this comes with risks as well and I would love to hear your thoughts about this.

I have designed a survey, which you can find from page 5 onwards. I have pre-tested the survey questions in a pilot and have had to make many difficult decisions. I cannot change the survey questions anymore, because all the survey questions are already being translated to Dutch, French, Germany, Russian, Turkish and Arabic. I will pre-register the whole list of hypotheses and decide how to divide them into papers later on. I did, however, write the intro/theory/methods-sections of three possible papers already. I included these on page 15 onwards so you can get an idea of my theoretical jumping off point.

I hope to hear what you think of my hypotheses. I'm debating whether to pre-register at OSF or elsewhere. I hope to hear your ideas about this as well.

Thank you so much for your attention!

Kind regards,

Sanne van Oosten

Hypotheses

Top down categorization or bottom up identification?

- Top down categorizations of race, religion and gender does not perfectly predict bottom up identification. In other words: whether a respondent fulfills the requirements that enable categorization into a racial, religious or gender group does not necessarily mean they identify as such.
- Identification predicts vote choice, notions of representation, trust and capability more strongly than categorization does.
- Citizens who attribute experiences of discrimination to their race, religion and/or gender are more likely to be high-identifiers.
- I control for age, residency, education, income and employment status.

Policy positions:

- Redistribution:
 - o Categorized racial and religious (Islam) minorities and women are more for redistribution than their racial and religious (Christianity and non-religious) majority and male counterparts.
 - o High-identifying racial and religious minorities or women are even more pro-redistribution than both their low-identifying and racial and religious majority and male counterparts alike.
- Sustainability:
 - o Categorized racial and religious (Islam) minorities and men are more against sustainability than their racial and religious (Christianity and non-religious) majority and female counterparts.
 - o High-identifying racial and religious minorities or men are even more against sustainability than their low-identifying and racial and religious majority and male counterparts alike.
- Immigration and Islam:
 - o Categorized racial and religious (Islam) minorities and women are more in favor of immigration and Islam than their racial and religious (Christianity and non-religious) majority and male counterparts.
 - o High-identifying racial and religious minorities or women are even more in favor of immigration and Islam than both their low-identifying and racial and religious majority and male counterparts alike.
- Gender and sexuality:
 - o Categorized racial and religious (Islam) minorities and men are more against gender and sexual-equality than their racial and religious (Christianity and non-religious) majority and female counterparts.
 - o High-identifying racial and religious minorities or men are even more against gender and sexual-equality than their low-identifying and racial and religious majority and male counterparts alike.
- I control for age, residency, education, income and employment status.

Political efficacy:

- Categorized racial and religious (Islam) minorities and women **score lower on the political efficacy-scale** than their racial and religious (Christianity and non-religious) majority and male counterparts.
- High-identifying racial and religious minorities or women score even lower on the political efficacy-scale than both their low-identifying and racial and religious majority and male counterparts alike.
- I control for age, residency, education, income and employment status.

Party preferences:

- Categorized racial and religious (Islam) minorities and women **prefer left-wing political parties** more than their racial and religious (Christianity and non-religious) majority and male counterparts.
- High-identifying racial and religious minorities or women prefer left-wing political parties more than both their low-identifying and racial and religious majority and male counterparts alike.
- I control for age, residency, education, income and employment status.

Preference votes:

- Categorized racial and religious (Islam) minorities are more likely to cast a preference vote for a congruent group member than their racial and religious (Christianity and non-religious) majority counterparts.
- High-identifying racial and religious minorities are even more likely to cast a preference vote for a congruent group member than their low-identifying and racial and religious majority and male counterparts alike.
- This effect is stronger for racial and religious minorities who have experienced discrimination that they attribute to their race or religion.
- Women do not cast more preference votes for women than men do.
- Same goes for high-identifying women.
- I control for age, residency, education, income and employment status.

Projection, assumption or identification?

- Projection-hypothesis: Citizens expect politicians to have the same policy positions as themselves if only provided racial, religious and gender characteristics.
- Prediction-hypothesis: A politician's race, religion and gender predicts which policy position citizens expect them to have.
- Identification-hypothesis: citizens who identify with the same racial, religious and/or gender-group as the politician presented to them, expect those politicians to have the same policy positions as themselves, whereas they expect other policy positions to occur more often amongst politicians with whom they do not share racial, religious and/or gender identification.
- I control for age, residency, education, income and employment status.

How do descriptive, substantive and formal representation influence symbolic representation?

- Descriptive representation hypothesis: Racial and religious congruency predicts hypothetical vote choice, notions of representation, trust and perceived capability. Gender congruency does not do so.

- Substantive representation hypothesis: Policy position congruency predicts hypothetical vote choice, notions of representation, trust and perceived capability even more than racial and religious congruency.
- Formal representation hypothesis: Formal representation (voting system) does not influence this process, the descriptive and substantive representation hypothesis apply for France, Germany and the Netherlands equally.
- I control for age, residency, education, income and employment status.

How do race, religion and gender influence how citizens choose and evaluate politicians?

- With regard to the general population, citizens do not choose and evaluate racial and religious minority and female politicians any differently than they do their racial and religious majority and male counterparts.
- Social identity theory: citizens favor politicians with the same race and religion as themselves but neither favor nor disfavor politicians with the same gender as themselves.
- System justification theory: members of the most disadvantaged groups in society tend to favor policy that strengthens the most advantaged groups in society.
- Intersectionality: congruent and intersecting group memberships of both citizen and politician characteristics influence choice and evaluation of politician more than a sum of its parts would suggest.
- I control for age, residency, education, income and employment status.

What happens when we ask citizens to choose or evaluate politicians who break expectations?

- Prototypicality theory: Citizens evaluate politicians who are prototypical with regard to both policy positions and personal characteristics more positively, especially by high-identifying group members.
- Expectancy violation theory: When politicians of minority groups have unexpected policy positions, citizens are slower in evaluating them, but when they do their evaluations are more extremely positive or negative.
- I control for age, residency, education, income and employment status.

National Belonging, racial identification and social distance

- Racial identification is constant amongst citizens of France, Germany and the Netherlands with a Turkish background.
- Racial identification varies amongst groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands.
- Amongst racial minorities, national belonging varies between France, Germany and the Netherlands.
- Racial and religious high-identifiers (majority and minority) experience more social distance to other groups (majority and minority).
- National Belonging, racial identification and social distance predict how citizens choose and evaluate politicians.

PART1

In which country was your mother born?

[drop-down-menu]

In which country was your father born?

[drop-down-menu]

PART2

The tax rate for the rich must be lower

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

Our government should lower the support for the unemployed

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

Our government should do less to combat climate change than now

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

Our government needs to lower fuel prices

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

Immigrants are a burden to our country

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

Islam should be restricted by law

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

That men and women receive equal pay for equal work should not be regulated by law

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

Homosexual couples should not be allowed to adopt children

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

Please answer the following questions:

1. How interested would you say you are in politics?

[0-10=11-point-scale/Not at all interested-very interested]

2. Can people like you have an influence on politics?

[0-10=11-point-scale/Not at all-A great deal]

3. Generally, how much do you trust politicians?

[0-10=11-point-scale/No trust at all-Complete trust]

Please indicate the likelihood that you will ever vote for the following parties. If you are certain that you will never vote for this party then choose 0; if you are certain to vote for this party someday, then enter 10. Of course you can also choose an intermediate position.

- 50Plus: [0-10=11-point-scale/Will never vote-Certain to vote]
- CDA: [0-10=11-point-scale/Will never vote-Certain to vote]
- ChristenUnie: [0-10=11-point-scale/Will never vote-Certain to vote]
- D66: [0-10=11-point-scale/Will never vote-Certain to vote]

Commented [SBv01]: This is a large-scale filter question. Based on the answers of the respondents we will oversample respondents with one or both parents born in Turkey, Morocco and Surinam.

Commented [SBv02]: The control group sees the following statement: The tax rate for the rich must be **higher**

Commented [SBv03]: The control group sees the following statement: Our government should **raise** the support for the unemployed.

Commented [SBv04]: The control group sees the following statement: Our government should do **more** to combat climate change than now

Commented [SBv05]: The control group sees the following statement: Our government needs to **raise** fuel prices.

Commented [SBv06]: The control group sees the following statement: Immigrants are **an asset** to our country

Commented [SBv07]: The control group sees the following statement: Islam should **not** be restricted by law

Commented [SBv08]: The control group sees the following statement: That men and women receive equal pay for equal work should be regulated by law

Commented [SBv09]: The control group sees the following statement: Homosexual couples should be allowed to adopt children

- DENK: [0-10=11-point-scale/Will never vote-Certain to vote]
- FvD: [0-10=11-point-scale/Will never vote-Certain to vote]
- GroenLinks: [0-10=11-point-scale/Will never vote-Certain to vote]
- PvdA: [0-10=11-point-scale/Will never vote-Certain to vote]
- PvdD: [0-10=11-point-scale/Will never vote-Certain to vote]
- PVV: [0-10=11-point-scale/Will never vote-Certain to vote]
- SGP: [0-10=11-point-scale/Will never vote-Certain to vote]
- SP: [0-10=11-point-scale/Will never vote-Certain to vote]
- VVD: [0-10=11-point-scale/Will never vote-Certain to vote]

Did you vote at the last Dutch national elections on 15 march 2017?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

Did you vote for the first candidate on the party list or for another candidate?

- First candidate
- Other candidate
- Don't know

Commented [SBvO10]: [Preferential vote, only in the Netherlands version]

What were the most important reasons for you to vote for this candidate?

- Candidate is a woman
- The candidates ethnic background
- The candidates religion
- Best candidate
- Supports certain interests
- Is from neighbourhood/region
- Knew candidate personally
- Other reason, namely... [specify]
- Don't know

Commented [SBvO11]: [If answered "other candidate"]

Commented [SBvO12]: [Multiple options possible]

Did this have something to do with supporting the first candidate on the list or supporting the party you voted for?

- Supporting the first candidate
- Supporting the party you voted for

Commented [SBvO13]: [If answered "first candidate"]

Who did you vote for?

Commented [SBvO14]: [optional, open text box]

PART3a

You will see a number of profiles of potential politicians. Imagine these are politicians in the Dutch parliament. The profiles are very short, so it might be hard to answer. Please try to answer the questions the best you can.

Politician 1 has a Moroccan background and she practices Islam.

What do you think her policy position is most likely to be?

- A. Homosexual couples should not be allowed to adopt children
- B. Homosexual couples should be allowed to adopt children
- C. I don't know

Commented [SBvO15]: This is a randomly selected statement, selected from the full list of statements.

Politician 2 has a Surinamese background and she does not practice any religion.

What do you think her policy position is most likely to be?

- A. Islam should not be restricted by law
- B. Islam should be restricted by law
- C. I don't know

Commented [SBvO16]: This is a randomly selected statement, selected from the full list of statements.

PART3b

You will see a number of profiles of potential politicians. Imagine these are politicians in the Dutch parliament and please answer the questions. After you answer the questions, you will be given the chance to explain why, although you certainly do not have to offer any reasons.

Politician 3 has a Turkish background and practices Islam. He says the tax rate for the rich must be higher

- Do you think this politician represents you?

[0-10=11-point-scale/No-Yes]

- How much do you trust this politician?

[0-10=11-point-scale/not at all-very much]

- How capable do you think this politician is to perform well on the job?

[0-10=11-point-scale/Not at all-Very much]

Politician 4 has a Moroccan background and does not practice any religion. She says our government should do less to combat climate change than now

- Do you think this politician represents you?

[0-10=11-point-scale/No-Yes]

- How much do you trust this politician?

[0-10=11-point-scale/not at all-very much]

- How capable do you think this politician is to perform well on the job?

[0-10=11-point-scale/Not at all-Very much]

Which politician are you most likely to vote for?

- A. Politician 3
- B. Politician 4

Politician 5 has a Turkish background and practices Islam. She says our government should do less to combat climate change than now

- Do you think this politician represents you?

[0-10=11-point-scale/No-Yes]

- How much do you trust this politician?

[0-10=11-point-scale/not at all-very much]

- How capable do you think this politician is to perform well on the job?

[0-10=11-point-scale/Not at all-Very much]

Politician 6 has a Moroccan background and does not practice any religion. She says the financial state support for the unemployed should be lowered

- Do you think this politician represents you?

[0-10=11-point-scale/No-Yes]

- How much do you trust this politician?

[0-10=11-point-scale/not at all-very much]

- How capable do you think this politician is to perform well on the job?

[0-10=11-point-scale/Not at all-Very much]

Which politician are you most likely to vote for?

- A. Politician 5
- B. Politician 6

Politician 7 has a Turkish background and practices Islam. She says that men and women receive equal pay for equal work should be regulated by law

- Do you think this politician represents you?

[0-10=11-point-scale/No-Yes]

- How much do you trust this politician?

[0-10=11-point-scale/not at all-very much]

- How capable do you think this politician is to perform well on the job?

[0-10=11-point-scale/Not at all-Very much]

Politician 8 has a Moroccan background and

does not practice any religion. She says the government support for the unemployed should be lowered

- Do you think this politician represents you?

[0-10=11-point-scale/No-Yes]

- How much do you trust this politician?

[0-10=11-point-scale/not at all-very much]

- How capable do you think this politician is to perform well on the job?

[0-10=11-point-scale/Not at all-Very much]

Which politician are you most likely to vote for?

- C. Politician 7
- D. Politician 8

Do you have any comments?

PART5

Please rank the characteristics which describe you best.

- Being of a certain ethnic group
- Being a man/woman
- Being a mother/father
- The neighborhood I live in
- The music I listen to
- Being a vegetarian/vegan
- The city I live in
- The work I do
- My age
- The place I was born
- My religion
- The political party I vote for or am a member of
- My volunteer work
- The sports I do
- My ideas about the environment
- The media I consume
- Educational attainment
- Other [specify]

Do you feel generally accepted as belonging to the country you live in?

[0-10=11-point-scale/Not at all-Completely]

How emotionally attached do you feel to the Netherlands?

[0-10=11-point-scale/Not at all-Completely]

How different or the same do you consider yourself to be from:

- Native Dutch people: [0-10=11-point-scale/Completely same-Completely different]
- Dutch Moroccan people: [0-10=11-point-scale/Completely same-Completely different]
- Dutch Surinamese people: [0-10=11-point-scale/Completely same-Completely different]
- Dutch Turkish people: [0-10=11-point-scale/Completely same-Completely different]
- People who practice Islam: [0-10=11-point-scale/Completely same-Completely different]
- People who practice Christianity: [0-10=11-point-scale/Completely same-Completely different]
- People who do not practice any religion: [0-10=11-point-scale/Completely same-Completely different]

In terms of my ethnic group, I consider myself to be... (max. 2 choices possible)

- Antillean
- Arabic
- Aruban
- Berber
- Bonairean
- Curacaoan
- Creole
- Dutch
- Hindostan
- Turkish
- Kurdish
- Moroccan
- Surinamese
- Other [specify]

Which two ethnic groups are the most important to you? Fill in the most important group to you under 1 and the other one under 2. If you cannot choose between the two, please tick the box.

1.

2.

both groups are equally important to me

Answer the following questions about being [ethnicgroup-1]

1. In general, I prefer doing things with [ethnicgroup-1] people

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

2. The world would be a much better place if all other groups are like [ethnicgroup-1] people

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

3. I don't think it is good to mix with people from other groups

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

4. We should always put [ethnicgroup-1] interests first and not be oversensitive about the interests of others

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

Answer the following questions about being [ethnicgroup-2]

1. In general, I prefer doing things with [ethnicgroup-2] people

Commented [SBv017]: [only show if the respondent ticks 2 or more ethnic groups in previous questions]

Commented [SBv018]: If the respondent ticks this box, the 1 and the 2 will disappear.

Commented [SBv019]: [Only if the respondent answered a second ethnic group]

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

2. The world would be a much better place if all other groups are like [ethnicgroup-2] people

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

3. I don't think it is good to mix with people from other groups

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

4. We should always put [ethnicgroup-2] interests first and not be oversensitive about the interests of others

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

In your day-to-day life, how often do any of the following things happen to you?

1. You are treated with less courtesy than other people are.
2. You are treated with less respect than other people are.
3. You receive poorer service than other people at restaurants or stores.
4. People act as if they think you are not smart.
5. People act as if they are afraid of you.
6. People act as if they think you are dishonest.
7. People act as if they're better than you are.
8. You are called names or insulted.
9. You are threatened or harassed.
10. You receive angry or hateful messages online
 - Almost every day
 - At least once a week
 - A few times a month
 - A few times a year
 - Less than once a year
 - Never

What do you think is the main reason for these experiences?

1. Your Ancestry or National Origins
2. Your Gender
3. Your Race
4. Your Age
5. Your Religion
6. Your Height
7. Your Weight
8. Some other Aspect of Your Physical Appearance
9. Your Sexual Orientation
10. Your Education or Income Level
11. Your Profession
12. Other [specify]

1. I'm a typical [man/woman]

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

1. Most women fail to appreciate fully all that men do for them.

Commented [SBv020]: [Follow-up Question, Asked only of those answering "A few times a year" or more frequently to at least one question:]

Commented [SBv021]: [based on the data we already have about whether they identify as male or female]

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

2. Men are not complete without women.

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

3. Women often complain about being discriminated against for no good reason.

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

4. Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist.

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?

- Yes
- No

Which one?

- Christian
- Muslim
- Hindu
- Buddhist
- Jewish
- Other, [specify]

Commented [SBv022]: [If the above question was answered as yes]

Do you consider yourself to be:

- Sunni
- Shia
- Alevi
- Other, [specify]

Commented [SBv023]: [If answered Muslim]

Do you consider yourself to be:

- Catholic
- Protestant
- Other, [specify]

Commented [SBv024]: [If answered Christian]

1. In general, I prefer doing things with people from my own religion than with people from different religions

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

2. The world would be a much better place if all other religions are like mine

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

3. I don't think it is good to mix with people from other religions

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

4. We should always put our religions interests first and not be oversensitive about the interests of others

[0-10=11-point-scale/Disagree-Agree]

Commented [SBv025]: [If Christian or Muslim]

Commented [OSv26]: This is the end of the survey as designed by me (Sanne). Of each respondent, we will also have the answers to the following survey-questions (filled in earlier by themselves)

In which year were you born?
[fill-in-year]

In which region/state do you live?
[all-provinces-of-DE-FR-NL]

Which of the following best describes the area where you live?

- A big city
- The suburbs or outskirts of a big city
- A town or a small city
- A country village
- A farm or home in the countryside
-

Which is the highest degree you have finished (so far)?

- Low
- Medium
- High (HBO\WO)

Taking everything into account, at about what level is your household's standard of living?
If you think of a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means a poor household, 7 a rich household, and the other numbers are for the positions in between, about where would you place your household?

- 1 - poor household
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 - rich household

Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?

- 1 - Not at all religious
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 - Very religious

Which one of the following best describes your employment status?
Please choose the answer option that most accurately describes your situation.

- In permanent full-time employment
- In permanent part-time employment
- Self-employed / Freelance
- Retired
- Student (in school or internship)

- House wife / House husband
- Unable to work / disabled
- Without work and looking for work
- Without work and not looking for work
- Temporary, seasonal or occasional work
- In unpaid employment (e.g. voluntary work) or full-time care of other household member
- Prefer not to say

What is your current/has been your last main occupation?

- Legislator, Senior Official, or Manager
- Professional (engineer, doctor, teacher, clergy, etc.)
- Technician or Associate Professional (inspector, finance dealer, etc.)
- Clerk (secretary, cashier, etc.)
- Service or sales worker (cook, travel guide, shop salesperson, etc.)
- Agricultural or fishery worker (vegetable grower, livestock producer, etc.)
- Craft or trades worker (carpenter, painter, jewelry worker, butcher, etc.)
- Plant/machine operator or assembler (equipment assembler, sewing-machine operator, driver, etc.)
- Elementary worker (street food vendor, shoe cleaner, etc.)
- Armed forces (government military)

Rough drafts to the introduction/theory/methods-sections of the first papers I want to write with this data.

To give you an idea of which theoretical perspectives I'm thinking from.

I already wrote and submitted a meta-analysis:

Paper 1. Shared identification? Race and gender in candidate experiments: a meta-analysis and research agenda

Abstract

How do race and gender influence voters' choices and evaluations of candidates for political office? To address this question, we pooled data from 52 candidate experiments – with a combined N of 173,811 – published in SSCI-ranked political science journals between 1981 and 2018. While our meta-analysis reveals that candidate race and gender have negligible effects on voters' choices and evaluations, we argue that instead of viewing candidate identities in isolation, we need to consider the congruence between voter and candidate characteristics. Re-analysing the data from this perspective, we find that gender congruence hardly matters, while race congruence matters enormously. We explain this difference in terms of the salience of group identification, present for racial congruence but not for gender congruence. In the proposed research agenda, we advocate a shared identification perspective and a novel intersectional approach to study it.

Now under review at EJPR.

Paper 2. Top down categorization or bottom up identification?

Paper 3: Projection, prediction or identification?

Paper 4.

What drives candidate preferences: descriptive representation or expected substantive representation?

Introduction

Representation is a central tenet of modern democracies. We know notions of representation influence perceived responsiveness and subsequent external efficacy (Esaiasson, Kölln, & Turper, 2015) which, in turn, go on to form political and institutional trust (Hakhverdian & Mayne, 2012; Mishler & Rose, 2001). As notions of representation set off an important chain of events, we need to know how our representative democracy is functioning by unearthing what drives representational preferences. To know that we need to unearth the causal path that precedes notions of representation. Are citizens seeking to gain descriptive or substantive representation?

Despite countless studies using candidate experiments (e.g. recently we have seen: Atkeson and Hamel, 2018; Carson, Ruppanner, & Lewis, 2019; Hee Go, 2018; Horiuchi, Smith and Yamamoto, 2018; Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth, 2018; Leslie, Stout and Tolbert, 2019; Gershon & Lavariega Monforti, 2019; Kevins, 2019; Lemi & Brown, 2019) we still don't know why certain citizens prefer politicians with specific personal characteristics. Is it because of the expected policy implications citizens deduce from their personal characteristics? Or is it because they expect to sympathize with the politician irrespective of policy? Indeed, this remains an "open question" (Webster & Pierce, 2019, p. 636). In other words: What do citizens do? "Policy voting" or "demographic voting"? (Cutler, 2002, p. 466). The only research we know of that gathers data that could answer this question is "inconclusive" (Arnesen, Duell, & Johannesson, 2019, p. 46). We take on the challenge to answer this question more thoroughly.

We tackle this question by using conjoint experiments to mimic widespread low-information settings. We illustrate how ubiquitous low-information elections are with arguably the most well-known politicians of the world: Obama and Trump. Research finds that the general public is often not even aware of their most important policies (Maxwell & Shields, 2014) or biographical features (McDonald, Karol, & Mason, 2019) respectively. When the general public knows so little about the politicians they vote for, heuristics are an easy source of information to "fall back" onto (Cutler, 2002, p. 466). All people employ cognitive shortcuts (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001, p. 952), both those who are politically knowledgeable and those who are not (Cutler, 2002) and especially when they need to choose out of more than two different candidates (Aguilar, Cunow, Desposato, & Barone, 2015; Crowder-Meyer, Gadarian, Trounstone, & Vue, 2018). Perhaps counter-intuitively, political sophisticates use personal characteristics more intensely than political novices (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001, p. 951).

Heuristics are "a category-based process of impression formation [which] imposes minimal cognitive costs on the individual" (Koch, 2000, p. 416). First, gender is generally understood the most visible "readily available piece of information" (Koch, 2000, p. 414) and can therefore serve as a cue in real life low-information settings (Matson & Fine, 2006). Second, racial minority voters may use a "racial utility heuristic" (Bird, Saalfeld, & Wüst, 2010, p. 10) which means they use the interest of their

group as a proxy of their own individual interest. Furthermore, because the majority of politicians in North-America and Europe is white, citizens are likely to view racial minorities as “exceptional” (Fisher, Heath, Sanders, & Sobolewska, 2014, p. 887) and, consequentially, especially racial minorities have “greater incentives to pay attention” (Wolak & Juenke, 2019, p. 18). Moreover, in a society where immigration (and its assumed link to racism and xenophobia) is an increasingly politically salient issue (Dennison & Geddes, 2019, p. 108), we argue this state of exceptionality is likely to be viewed as a source for policy information for both members of minority and majority racial groups. Therefore, we question: is the assumed policy information that drives preferences, or is it a desire for “an MP who looks like me” irrespective of the associated policy positions?

We intend to answer our main research question through a series of sub-questions. 1) Do citizens prefer politicians with whom they share the same characteristics, irrespective of the policy positions these politicians hold? According to, what we call, the *descriptive representation hypothesis*, the answer to this question is yes. However, we wonder whether this is a direct effect, or actually mediated by policy expectations.

We also test the *substantive representation hypothesis*. 2) Do race, religion and gender influence what policy positions citizens expect politicians to have? We want to answer this question on both sides of the citizen/politician-equation. 2a) What do citizens expect politicians from racial and religious minority groups and women to stand for? 2b) Do racial and religious minority groups and women have different expectations of politicians who are part of their own ethnic and religious group than racial and religious majority group members and men do? We also need to know what policy positions citizens themselves have, to know whether they are actually making a policy vote when only personal characteristics are presented to them. 2c) when expectations overlap with preferences, do specific races, religions and genders garner more positive results? If so, the opposite should also be the case; when expectations do not overlap with preferences, do specific races, religions and genders garner more negative results? According to the *substantive representation hypothesis*, all of the answers to this should be yes. If we cannot answer these questions with yes, we will have to conclude that citizens inform their preferences through a drive for descriptive representation, without taking assumed policy implications into account.

Lastly, through our comparative design, we also test the *formal representation hypothesis*. As electoral systems influence the level of descriptive representation of racial and religious minorities and women, we expect electoral systems, by means of general descriptive representation, to influence reactions of citizens to descriptive representation. Which brings us to subquestion 3) Does the general level of descriptive representation in a certain country influence how citizens react to descriptive representation?

Even if our outcomes are also “inconclusive” (Arnesen et al., 2019, p. 46), we will gain knowledge about what people expect from politicians. Expectations influence subsequent experiences of representations. Either the politician at hand does do what is expected or does not. Expectations color evaluations and thereby influence how citizens evaluate representative democracy as a whole. In sum, this research does not only inform us about how citizens make voting choices and thus how power is obtained, we will get closer to understanding the inner workings of our representative democracy.

Theoretical framework

Pitkin's seminal book *The Concept of Representation* (1967), conceptualizes representation with four distinct yet "integrated" (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005) dimensions. First, *formal* representation consists of the "the rules and procedures regulating the selection and removal of representatives" (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005, p. 408), which ranges from the initial 'authorization' (Pitkin, 1967, p. 51) to subsequent 'accountability' (Pitkin, 1967, p. 57). Second, *descriptive* representation is about 'being sufficiently like' (Pitkin, 1967, p. 81) those who are being represented. This usually refers to "the composition of representative institutions should mirror the composition of the represented in important respects" (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005, p. 408). Third, *substantive* representation has to do with "acting in the interests of the represented in a manner responsive to them" (Pitkin, 1967, p. 209). Fourth, *symbolic* representation, which is a 'state of mind, the condition of satisfaction or belief' (Pitkin, 1967, p. 106) and includes the question whether 'the representative [is] believed in' (Pitkin, 1967, p. 102) and how they are "perceived and evaluated by those they represent" (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005, p. 409).

Although Pitkin intended these dimensions to be integrated due to their causal linkage, this causal relationship between all four dimensions is largely "ignored in practice" (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005, p. 409). We want to change this by integrating all four dimensions. First, how does formal representation influence descriptive representation? In the literature, this turns out to be the most straightforward causal link. Formal representation shapes the conditions for minority groups and women to participate (Hughes, 2016). We know the more free and fair elections are, the more women are prone to participate (Kanthak & Woon, 2015), thus leading to more descriptive representation of women. Voting systems influence whether minorities make it into office. Plurality-majority systems generally lead to low numbers religious minorities and women whereas proportional representation-systems lead to relatively high numbers of religious minorities and women (Hughes, 2016, p. 562). In sum, formal representation influences descriptive representation, both in whether women and minorities are prone to run and whether they are elected if they do so (Bloemraad, 2013, p. 574; Schönwälder, 2013, p. 634).

Second, to what extent does descriptive representation lead to substantive representation? This is the most studied and unresolved representational link throughout the last decades (e.g. Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 2013, p. 565; Saalfeld & Bischof, 2013). This intensely theorized and researched body of literature has split into two schools of thought. The first school of thought postulates that descriptive representation leads to substantive representation (e.g. Phillips, 1995; Young, 2000) while the second school of thought contends the opposite: descriptive representation does not necessarily lead to substantive representation (Dahlerup, 1988; Dovi, 2002; Weldon, 2002). We discuss these two schools of thought by highlighting the arguments of some of the most important scholars. We argue that symbolic representation needs to be integrated in this body of literature to bring our knowledge further.

Phillips (1995) is the most distinctive author of the first school of thought as she identifies four arguments for increasing the presence of women in politics. Besides role models, justice and how 'their presence will enhance the quality of political life', she also gives a salient argument that is relevant to this discussion: the presence of women will enhance the visibility of 'particular interests

of women that would be otherwise overlooked' (Phillips, 1995, pp. 62–63); in this way, she argues, descriptive representation will lead to substantive representation.

Young (2000) also emphasizes the importance of descriptive representation. However, she approaches the issue from a more individual perspective, highlighting the communicational relationship between voter and representative through 'affirmative uses of rhetoric' (2000, p. 57) to the resultant creation of 'narratives and situated knowledges' (2000, p. 70). In stressing the importance of communication, she connects representatives and the represented and argues that being similarly positioned in society creates a shared social perspective among group members. Pitkin would be a part of the first school of thought because she "expect[s] the composition [of a legislature] to determine the activities" (Pitkin, 1967, p. 63).

However, the first school of thought is lacking in conclusive empirical evidence. Therefore, the second school of thought postulates that descriptive representation does not necessarily lead to substantive representation (Dahlerup, 1988; Dovi, 2002; Weldon, 2002). Dahlerup's (1988) position within this school of thought has been understood to be somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, she introduced the notion of a 'critical mass' of women to the scientific debate as being necessary to have women's voices translate into policy. On the other hand, she explicitly separates descriptive from substantive representation as two separate occurrences when she suggests that a 'critical mass' does not necessarily lead to 'critical acts' (Dahlerup, 1988).

Dovi introduces the notion of 'preferable descriptive representatives' who do not necessarily have certain inborn characteristics, but do have 'strong mutual relationships with dispossessed subgroups' (Dovi, 2002, p. 735) which, we argue, can only be present when 'the representative [is] believed in' (Pitkin, 1967, p. 102) and there is a 'dynamic relationship' (Saward, 2010, p. 298). Not only does the representative recognize him- or herself as part of a historically dispossessed subgroup, this subgroup also recognizes the specific representative as such and both parties have 'a common understanding of the proper aims' (Dovi, 2002, p. 736) that should be pursued. Under these conditions, descriptive representation can lead to substantive representation. However, these conditions are not omnipresent meaning that the causal link between descriptive and substantive representation is in no way universal. We emphasize that these conditions under which descriptive representation leads to substantive representation are reminiscent of symbolic representation, the fourth of Pitkin's dimensions of representation. Which calls for the inclusion of symbolic representation as a way to study the link between descriptive and substantive representation.

More recently, Saward refocused on Pitkin's symbolic representation, 'build[ing] both on and away from [Pitkin]' (Saward, 2010, p. 16) and coined the term 'representative claim'. Within this claims-making approach, Saward questions whether representation is a 'given, factual product of elections' as opposed to a 'claim about a dynamic relationship' (2010, p. 298). Representative claims are constructed, interactive and 'only work, or even exist, if "audiences" acknowledge them in some way, and are able to absorb or reject or accept them or otherwise engage with them' (2010, p. 303). Although we appreciate the revival of the importance of the reaction of citizens who are said to be represented, we consider Saward to go a bit too far down the "constructionist cul-de-sac" (Hammersley, 2008, p. 34) in his claims-making approach. We want to put the reaction of the citizen front and center, whilst still viewing it as a part of a possible causal chain of representational events running from formal to descriptive and possibly also running to substantive and symbolic

representation. We position symbolic representation as a hypothesized consequence of either descriptive or substantive representation and want to know which causal link is the strongest.

As it is unclear what citizens have in mind when asked to evaluate descriptive representation, we want to delve into this question more thoroughly. Do citizens deduce substantive representation from descriptive representation? Or do they adjust their perceptions to the question whether the politician is like them and therefore likeable? Again, this remains an “open question” (Webster & Pierce, 2019, p. 636). While there is a large literature on how competent citizens perceive women and minorities to be (Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; Leeper, 1991; Nelson, 2015; Rosenwasser & Seale, 1988; Schneider & Bos, 2016; Terkildsen, 1993), not much literature focusses on how the personal characteristics of a politician (such as race, religion and gender) shape what issues citizens expect them to stand for.

We only know of one study that explicitly studies the link between descriptive representation and assumed substantive representation by Arnesen, Duell and Johannesson (2019). They find respondents use some social characteristics for some political issues, but not others (2019, p. 55). Gender and religion, along with occupation and level of education, are the personal characteristics that give significant expectations with regard to the issues presented to respondents. Age, marital status and region do not influence the issues at hand. Indeed, respondents expect female politicians to agree more positively with a statement on income inequality (“The state should reduce income inequality”) and refugee rights (“Refugees should have the same right to social assistance as citizens”), and more negatively with the statement on an, in our opinion shaky, statement on emission reduction (“Most of the carbon emissions reductions should be done abroad”). For Muslims, the expectations respondents express are a bit different: the statement on income inequality for Muslim, does not give a significant result. Respondents do, however, expect Muslim politicians to be in favor of refugee rights and social assistance. Furthermore, respondents expect Muslims to be against relegating “carbon emissions reductions ... abroad” (Arnesen et al., 2019, p. 56). However, they do not 1) measure what respondents expect of racial minority politicians or 2) what respondents expect with racial, religious and gender categories intersect and 3) how these expectations influence choices respondents make remains unclear.

With a few adjustments to the research design we aim to refine our knowledge on whether descriptive representation influences symbolic representation by means of expected substantive representation or in and of itself. First, as gender and Islam gave the highest policy expectations, we build on this by putting these two attributes front and center. Second, although we appreciate Arnesen et al.’s attempt to study shared identification, there are not enough Muslims in their sample to study in-group expectations that are necessary to answer questions on descriptive representation. We don’t know whether Muslim respondents have the same expectations of Muslim politicians as non-Muslims or another religious outgroup and by oversampling Muslim respondents we will know whether this is the case. Third, we don’t know whether the label Muslim is a proxy for racial minority and want to know whether these labels garner different expectations or not. Fourth, we add gender and sexuality issues to the list of statements respondents can react to. Fifth, we employ an intersectional analysis (L. M. Mügge, 2019), because in real-life, categories are not present in a unitary, nor multiple but intersectional way (Hancock, 2007) meaning that different categories always influence each other and that if we want to come to an understanding of how

descriptive representation influences expectations of substantive representation, we need to know how categories influence each other in intersecting ways.

We come to the following hypotheses:

1. Descriptive representation hypothesis:
 - a. Intersections of race, religion and gender do not influence what policy positions citizens expect politicians to have.
 - b. Citizens prefer politicians with whom they share the same intersecting characteristics, irrespective of the policy positions these politicians hold.
2. Substantive representation hypothesis:
 - a. Intersections of race, religion and gender influence what policy positions citizens expect politicians to have.
 1. Respondents expect women to be more pro- redistribution, environment, multiculturalism and gender/sexual equality (and vice versa for men).
 2. Respondents expect Muslims and citizens with a migration background to be more pro- redistribution and multiculturalism and anti- environment and gender/sexual equality (and vice versa for Christians, politicians who do not practice any religion and politicians without a migration background).
 3. Intersections of race, religion and gender strengthen policy expectations.
 - b. When expectations overlap with attitudinal preferences, specific races, religions and genders garner more positive results, and vice versa.
3. Formal representation hypothesis:
 - a. Racial and religious minorities and female citizens from countries with low levels of descriptive representation of racial and religious minorities and women react more positively towards people from their same groups.
 - b. Racial and religious minorities and female citizens from countries with low levels of descriptive representation of racial and religious minorities and women have more extreme policy expectations towards candidates with whom they share one or more group memberships.

Data and methods

Experimental design

Because we want to know more about the *causal* relationship between Pitkin's four dimensions of representation (1967), we choose the study design with the maximum internal validity: experimental design. We understand the artificial nature of experiments (Portmann & Stojanović, 2018, p. 121) to be beneficial to mimicking the low-information setting ubiquitous for many voters in real-life election campaigns (Mcdermott, 1998). We take measures to limit social desirability bias by using the successful strategy of informing respondents that they will be able to explain their choices afterwards, as a way to save face (Krupnikov, Piston, & Bauer, 2016).

Because we want to include an intersectional design (Brah & Phoenix, 2004), we need to present our respondents with randomized profiles including racial, religious and gender characteristics at the same time. Such designs were previously referred to as vignette (Chauchard, 2016) or factorial

(Wallander, 2009) designs, now more often referred to as conjoint analysis (Hainmueller, Hopkins, & Yamamoto, 2014). More recently, researchers have started picking this method for intersectional research questions (Gershon & Lavariega Monforti, 2019; Kao & Benstead, 2017; Kevins, 2019; Lemi & Brown, 2019).

Comparative design: countries and minority groups

To be able to include all four dimensions on representation we need a comparative design that includes variation in electoral systems. We study France, Germany and the Netherlands. These three countries have different electoral systems, with corresponding levels of descriptive representation. France has a plurality-majority system leading to low numbers of racial and religious minorities and women; Germany has a mixed-proportional representation-system leading to intermediate levels of racial and religious minorities and women; the Netherlands has a proportional representation-system leading to relatively high numbers of racial and religious minorities and women (Hughes, 2016, p. 562). This allows us to study how Pitkin's notion of *formal* representation might lead to different reactions to *descriptive* representation as racial and religious minority and female politicians are more "exceptional" in some political systems than in others (Fisher et al., 2014, p. 887).

Moreover, we center our research questions around descriptive representation. This implies that we need sufficient numbers of respondents in all of the racial, religious and gender categories we are going to present to our respondents. As these are racial and religious minorities, we need oversample specific groups (Font & Méndez, 2013, p. 48). We select racial minority groups who report experiencing discrimination in the last twelve months the most (FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017, p. 31) as these groups are the most politically salient. Two exceptions: we select German citizens with a background in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) to be in line with the Immigrant German Election Study (Goerres, Spies, & Mayer, 2018) and French citizens with a Turkish background who we select to have a single common national background throughout the countries.

In the Netherlands, the oversample of groups of racial minority citizens will consist of Dutch citizens with a Turkish background, Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background and Dutch citizens with a Surinamese background. Dutch citizens with no migration background will also be sampled in a similar number as the other groups in order to compare and contrast to the other groups.

In Germany, the oversample of groups of racial minority citizens will consist of German citizens with a Turkish background and German citizens with a background in the former Soviet Union. The latter has, however, we argue this group is technically of the same racial group as German citizens with no migration background, but since they hold a unique position in German society as they are considered to be racially German whilst also being relatively recent migrants to the country (Goerres et al., 2018). With this group we can tease out what the difference is between migration background and racial difference. German citizens with no migration background will also be sampled in a similar number as the other groups in order to compare and contrast to the other groups.

In France, the oversample of groups of minority citizens will consist of French citizens with a North-African background (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria), French citizens with a background in Sub-Saharan African French-speaking countries (Niger, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, French Sudan, Senegal, Chad, Gabon, Cameroon, Congo) and French citizens with a Turkish background. The latter has, however,

not been selected on the basis of perceived discrimination or numerical presence, but in order to have one constant category across the three countries of our selection and be able to better study 'transnational communities' (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). French citizens with no migration background will also be sampled in a similar number as the other groups in order to compare and contrast to the other groups.

One challenge worth mentioning is the legal restrictions in all three countries concerning the saving of data on race and ethnicity (European Commission, 2018). To overcome these challenges, we will employ a large scale filter question to the Kantar/Lightspeed panels in all three countries. We will ask a very large sample to participate in a mini-survey. The first and only question of this mini-survey asks where their mother and father were born. If either one of their parent are born in a country of interest, we redirect this respondent to the full survey. If they are part of a group we do not want to oversample, either we terminate the sample or redirect a small percentage of the respondents to the full survey. This will enable us to form sizable groups of ethnic minority citizens for our final survey.

Variables:

By means of conjoint experiments, we will ask respondents which policy statement they expect specific politicians to hold. We randomize profiles that we randomize on the basis of race, religion and gender. The policy positions are either part of the socio-cultural or socio-economic dimension (Van Der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009). We divide the economic dimension into two sub dimensions tapping into issues on redistribution and income inequality on the one hand and green energy and sustainability on the other, while we divide the cultural dimension issues on immigration, integration and Islam on the one hand and gender and sexuality on the other. The statements are as follows: *The tax rate for the rich must be lower. Our government should lower the support for the unemployed. Our government should do less to combat climate change than now. Our government needs to lower fuel prices. Immigrants are a burden to our country. Islam should be restricted by law. That men and women receive equal pay for equal work should not be regulated by law. Homosexual couples should not be allowed to adopt children.* The control group sees the exact same statements reversed (i.e. *The tax rate for the rich must be higher instead of lower*).

Subsequently, we ask respondents to evaluate hypothetical politician profiles that we randomize on the basis of race, religion, gender and policy position. An example of a profile is as follows: *"Sebnem Yilmaz has a Turkish background and practices Islam. She says the government should lower the tax rate for the rich"*. After we present a single politician profile we ask respondents to answer the following three questions on a scale from 0 to 10: *Do you think this politician represents you? How much do you trust this politician? How capable do you think this politician is to perform well on the job?* We repeat this by presenting another politician profile and asking the same three questions. Then we ask respondents to choose between one of the two profiles by asking *Which politician are you most likely to vote for?*

As a robustness check, we measure whether personal preferences and subsequent projection (Koch, 2000, p. 420; Martinez, 1988) a.k.a. a "false consensus effect" (Conover & Feldman, 1989, p. 927) play a role in the expectations respondents have of specific politicians, we ask respondents what

their attitudes are towards the same list of eight policy statements (on a scale from 0 to 10) as discussed above.

Hypotheses

We will accept or reject our hypotheses with the following measures:

1. Descriptive representation hypothesis:
 - a. Race, religion and gender do not influence what policy positions citizens expect politicians to have. We will accept this hypothesis if more than 50% of the people answer “don’t know” to the policy expectations questions and/or if people do not expect policy that is either pro- or anti- redistribution, environment, multiculturalism, or (gender/sexual) equality. Probability means are not significantly different at the 0,05 level.
 - b. Citizens prefer politicians with whom they share the same characteristics, irrespective of the policy positions these politicians hold. We will accept this hypothesis if sharing the same race, religion or gender leads to significantly more positive forced choice outcomes, expectations of representation, trust and/or capability.
2. Substantive representation hypothesis:
 - a. Race, religion and gender influence what policy positions citizens expect politicians to have. We will accept this hypothesis if less than 50% of the respondents answer “don’t know” to the policy expectations questions and/or if people expect policy that is either pro- or anti- redistribution, environment, multiculturalism, or (gender/sexual) equality. Probability means are significantly different at the 0,05 level.
 - b. When expectations overlap with preferences, specific races, religions and genders garner more positive results, and vice versa. We will accept this hypothesis if we accept hypothesis 2a and the respondents who are positive towards that policy position are in turn more positive about the politicians that respondents expect that same policy position from and vice versa (we accept 2a and the respondents who are negative towards that policy position are in turn more negative about the politicians that respondents expect that same policy position to come from).
3. Formal representation hypothesis:
 - a. Racial and religious minorities and female citizens from a country with low levels of descriptive representation of racial and religious minorities and women have significantly (at 0,05 level) more positive reactions with regard to vote choice, felt representation, trust and capability than racial and religious minorities and female citizens in a country with high descriptive representation and to a lesser extent in a country with intermediate levels of descriptive representation.
 - b. The expectations of substantive representation for candidate profiles of racial and religious minorities and female candidates shows a significantly higher *variance* amongst racial and religious minorities and female citizens of a country with low levels of descriptive representation of racial and religious minorities and women than their counterparts in countries with high and intermediate levels of minority descriptive representation.

Paper 5. An MP who looks like me?

Intersections of race, religion and gender in citizen perceptions of politicians expectations and evaluations

Abstract

Do citizens care that representatives look like them? Using unique survey experiments, we seek to answer how intersections of race, religion and gender influence expectations and experiences of representation. In our theoretical framework, we combine approaches from political psychology, critical race studies and political science. We expect to find that shared identification shapes notions of representation and that an intersectional approach garners more truthful results. We present our respondents hypothetical and randomized experimental profiles combining racial, religious and gender characteristics with policy positions. Afterwards, we inquire about their feelings of representation, trust, capabilities and vote choice. We combine this with detailed information on identification saliency with race, religion and gender. We will oversample racial minority groups with a novel method that is in complete accordance with the strict European privacy regulations (GDPR) that have inhibited such research in the past. We present unique data showing the importance of shared identification, especially with regard to underrepresented minority groups. More importantly, we find that an intersectional analysis of both citizens and representatives turns prior research outcomes upside down. This has tremendous methodological and theoretical implications for not only the future of studies on representation, but also about the functioning of our representative democracy.

Introduction

In November 2014 an internal conflict within the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) (Huijnk, Dagevos, Gijsberts, & Andriessen, 2015) led to the expulsion of two Dutch Turkish members of parliament of the PvdA, Tunahan Kuzu and Selçuk Öztürk. They kept their seats in Parliament and announced that they would stay in Parliament ‘until the very end’ for ‘all the people who do not *feel* represented’ (Volkskrant, 2014, italics mine). Kuzu and Öztürk formed a new political party called DENK¹. They won three seats in Parliament in the 2017 parliamentary elections and established a considerable presence in many cities in the 2018 municipal elections as well (Vermeulen Oxford Handbook 2018, page 2). In interviews in the media their voters and candidates often underline they do not feel ‘represented’ (e.g. NRC, 2018; Parool, 2018; Telegraaf, 2016; Volkskrant, 2017).

Across Europe, 75% of ethnic minorities across Europe agree ‘we need more immigrant members of parliament’, 87,4% agreeing that they would be ‘better understood’ and 83,5% agreeing they would be ‘better represented’ if there were more MPs with their background (Huddleston & Tjaden, 2012). Despite being a sizeable portion of society, there is not a single representative in the Dutch parliament with a Surinamese or Antillean background. However, there is a higher percentage of politicians with a Turkish or a Moroccan background in the Dutch parliament than there are in the population (Kiesraad, 2017; CBS, 2016).

¹ DENK means *equality* in Turkish and *think* in Dutch.

One could argue that despite not *feeling* represented, Dutch Turkish or Dutch Moroccan people are in fact *descriptively* represented (Pitkin 1967). The problem lies in *symbolic* representation, is the representative 'believed in' (Pitkin, 1967, p. 102)? Could this be a consequence of lacking *substantive* representation, the 'activity, to speak for, act for, look after the interests of their respective groups' (Pitkin, 1967, p. 116)? Or in the words of a Flemish Turkish youngster: 'What good does it do that there are people like us in parliament if they fail to represent us?' (Akachar, 2018, p. 202).

Citizens can experience politicians to be 'like' them for a number of reasons. It could be race, religion, gender, policy positions or a combination of all of these aspects. We do not understand these aspects to be unitary, nor multiple, but intersectional (Hancock 2007). To study how descriptive and substantive representation cause notions of symbolic representation we present respondents (including an oversample of the largest groups with a migration background) in the Netherlands, Germany and France with a number of profiles of fictional politicians. We vary the politicians' race, religion, gender and policy positions and ask respondents questions about vote choice, perceived representativeness, trust and capability. In order to make sense of the reactions, we inquire about attitudes towards respondents' own race, religion, gender and policy positions. This way, we can disentangle to which extent identification with certain groups and policy positions influences evaluations of politicians who either do or do not share the same characteristics.

Social identity theory (Tajfel Turner 1979) forms the jumping-off point of our theoretical framework. In general, we expect in-group favoritism to inform most evaluations of politicians. However, Social Identity Theory has many shortcomings with regard to its applicability to socially hierarchical systems and policy positions. System Justification Theory (Jost et al. 2004) integrates both hierarchy and policy into one theory by positing that the dynamics of approval towards policy leading to in-group favoritism differ across groups which are associated with different levels of social status. For low-status groups, a more beneficial reaction to in-group politicians might be disapproval, leading to out-group favoritism as a way to justify the status quo. However, neither Social Identity Theory nor System Justification Theory theorize what the effect of the *combination* of politicians' personal characteristics and policy positions is. Prototypicality Theory (Haslam et al.) posits the expectation that citizens prefer leaders that express positions that are in line with what their group-membership would suggest, which they derive from research concerning sports teams, intra-university competition and partisanship. Notions of group-ness with regard to more inborn characteristics such as race, religion and gender remain understudied. Expectancy Violation Theory (Jussim et al 1987) provides explanations for the reactions of racial-majority group members towards racial-minority politicians that act in a way that violates expectancies. What this theory glosses over is, what happens when minority citizens evaluate in-group politicians who violate their expectations? Which brings us back to Social Identity Theory. We propose integrative innovations that take all the aspects of the above theories into account.

Because, in the end, the way people evaluate the politicians who are claimed to represent them is firmly anchored in the inner workings of our representative democracy (Dahl, 2000). Such evaluations should not only be seen as a dependent variable, but also as an independent variable in an ongoing chain of events (Hetherington, 1998). Such evaluations, in turn, influence legitimacy (Craig, Martinez, Gainous, & Kane, 2006; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005), democratic trust (Mishler

& Rose, 2001) and external efficacy and perceived responsiveness (Esaiasson et al., 2015). Since the evaluations of politicians by citizens matter so much to our democracy, we need to get straight to what extent these are shaped by the combination of race, religion, gender and policy positions.

Theoretical Framework

Conceptual framework

Pitkin's seminal book *The Concept of Representation*, conceptualizes representation using four dimensions. First, *formalistic* representation consists of the 'authorization' (Pitkin, 1967, p. 51) and 'accountability' (Pitkin, 1967, p. 57) that representation begins and usually also ends with. Second, *descriptive* representation is about 'being sufficiently like' (Pitkin, 1967, p. 81) those who are being represented. Third is the dimension this project will pay the most attention to, *symbolic* representation, which is a 'state of mind, the condition of satisfaction or belief' (Pitkin, 1967, p. 106) and includes the question whether 'the representative [is] believed in' (Pitkin, 1967, p. 102). Fourth, *substantive* representation has to do with the 'activity, to speak for, act for, look after the interests of their respective groups' (Pitkin, 1967, p. 116). When it comes to the example of DENK, one could argue that descriptive representation is not the problem and that substantive representation is not in question either. However, symbolic representation is a problem. Is the representative 'believed in' (Pitkin, 1967, p. 102)?

Nevertheless, descriptive and substantive representation have received the most scholarly attention (e.g. Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 2013, p. 565; Saalfeld & Bischof, 2013) with one school of thought postulating that descriptive representation leads to substantive representation (Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995; M. S. Williams, 2000; Young, 2000) and the other postulating descriptive and substantive representation are not related to each other (Dahlerup, 1988; Dovi, 2002; Weldon, 2002). We see symbolic representation as the missing link between descriptive and substantive representation as it depends on the alignment of descriptive and substantive representation. With this we have outlined the conceptual framework we will work with. In the next section we will outline the theoretical expectations we integrate.

Theoretical expectations

We are interested in how combinations of race, religion, gender and policy positions influence how citizens evaluate and choose politicians. Social identity theory developed in the 1970s (Tajfel, 1974; Turner & Reynolds, 2009) and predicts a general tendency towards in-group favoritism as a strategy to maximize *positive distinctiveness*: striving towards a positive self-group-image (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Permeability, legitimacy and stability drive positive distinctiveness strategies. If group boundaries are permeable an individual can choose which group they are a part of through individual mobility. If permeability of group boundaries is low and legitimacy and stability are high, groups engage collective social creativity through finding ways in which to boost their group's reputation. Conversely, if permeability, legitimacy and stability are all low, groups engage in social competition (Haslam, 2001, p. 25). As we understand permeability to be low for most groups, we expect most group-members to "act as a group" (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987,

p. 42). This means that we expect citizens to favor politicians that look like them with regard to race, religion and gender.

Hypothesis 1: Citizens tend to favor politicians with the same race, religion and gender as themselves.

Social Identity Theory both understand group membership as belonging to a singular bounded category. Intersectionality dissects categories by underlining the importance of understanding multiple identity² categories such as race, religion and gender as ‘mutually reinforcing’ (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1283) and ‘more than the sum of mutually exclusive parts’ (Hancock, 2007, p. 65). Indeed, previous research on politicians’ multiple identity categories reveal mutually reinforcing mechanisms that instill either “double jeopardy” or “multiple advantage” (Mügge & Erzeel, 2016). Double jeopardy posits that the disadvantages politicians face are *more than a sum of* her subordinate group memberships. Multiple advantage means the opposite. Belonging to more than one disadvantaged group actually cancels out part of the negative effect of the disadvantaged categories³. Moreover, contextual factors also influence the strength and direction of mutually reinforcing mechanisms (Emejulu & Mügge, 2018, p. 48). For instance, large-scale comparative research reveals that ethnic minority women are advantaged as opposed to ethnic minority men in proportional representation systems whereas the opposite applies to all other electoral systems (Hughes, 2016). We want to find out how the intersections of gender, race/ethnicity and religion of citizens influence evaluations of politicians of the same or different intersecting groups.

Hypothesis 2: Intersecting group memberships of both citizen and politician characteristics influence choice and evaluation of politician more than a sum of its parts would suggest.

Social Identity Theory and Intersectionality explain our theoretical expectations vis-à-vis race, religion and gender, but what about policy positions? System Justification Theory developed in the 1990s as a reaction to the pitfalls of Social Identity Theory and predicts social hierarchies to drive the extent of in-group favoritism, sometimes even leading to out-group favoritism in “members of disadvantaged groups” (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004, p. 881). Because people are motivated to justify existing hierarchies, there is an implicit internalization of inequality, especially amongst those who are most “harmed by the status quo” (Jost et al., 2004, p. 881). This means that disadvantaged citizens are less likely to be in favor of policy that would directly benefit them. [more examples based on policy]. Based on this, we cannot assume that citizens develop attitudes that are necessarily to their own group’s advantage.

Hypothesis 3: Members of the most disadvantaged groups in society tend to favor policy that strengthens the most advantaged groups in society.

That explains our theoretical expectations vis-à-vis race, religion, gender and policy positions separately. But what happens when these attributes are combined and embodied by a politician we ask citizens to evaluate? We set out to measure symbolic representation of the combination of

² We understand identity to mean the social categories in which an individual claims membership as well as the personal meaning associated with those categories (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004).

³ In the case of an intersectional identity mix that comprises both minority and majority identities we also expect the effect this has on citizen preferences to be anything but a *sum of its parts*.

characteristics and policy positions. Group Prototypicality⁴ Theory (Hains, Hogg and Duck 1997, Hogg Van Knippenberg and Rast 2012) studies how group members react to group leaders who are or are not prototypical with regard to their personal characteristics or behavior. Group prototypicality and evaluations, perceived effectiveness and endorsements are positively related, especially when identification with group membership is more salient (Hogg 2001 p. 191, 189). This is especially the case when it comes to policy positions: the higher the group membership salience in individuals, the more important “ingroup-favoring” policy positions are in influencing evaluations of group members (Platow and Van Knippenberg 2001).

Hypothesis 4: Politicians who are prototypical with regard to both policy positions and personal characteristics are evaluated more positively, especially by high-identifying group members.

In light of our research, Group Prototypicality Theory has two shortcomings. First, the research that it is based on rarely touches on memberships of racial, religious and gender groups but is more focused on, for instance, company loyalty, partisanship, sports teams and university spirit. Second, in their research the question as to what would be “in-group favoring” is perceived to be a given. However, it is almost impossible to know which policy on racial, religious and gender groups would ultimately favor which group. Indeed, within groups there is ample disagreement on which policy would further group interests the most (citation needed). Indeed, racial minority politicians need to walk a “precarious balance” at all times, because expectations of what they should or should not stand for are so high (Anderson 1997). Expectancy Violation Theory (Jussim et al 1987, Jackson et al 1993, Vescio and Biernat 1999) fulfills both shortcomings of Prototypicality Theory at once. It focusses on the evaluation of white and black subjects who either do or do not act according to what is expected of them based on the group they are a member of. Respondents evaluate black job applicants much more favorably than their white counterparts if they behave in an unexpectedly positive way. Conversely, if they behave in an unexpectedly negative way they receive lower evaluations than white job applicants with the same behavior (Jusstim et al p. 537). Expectancy violation causes more extreme evaluations in the direction of the violated expectation (p. 542). Not only that, when expectancies are violated people take longer to evaluate and show more emotions (Kernahan, Bartholow and Bettancourt 2000).

Hypothesis 5: When politicians of minority groups behave in unexpected ways, citizen are slower and more emotional in evaluating them, but when they do their evaluations are more extremely positive or negative.

Research in this field is mostly based on whites evaluating racial minority group members (cf. Avery et al. 2007). We want to study not only how racially dominant groups evaluate racially subordinate groups, but also how racially subordinate groups evaluate politicians of their own group. This brings us back to Social Identity Theory, where in-group evaluations are at the core of the focus. With that, we have come full circle. Each theory we discuss has unique strengths, as well as weaknesses, with regard to the applicability to our research. With our research we hope to contribute to an

⁴ This is not to be mistaken with Intersectional Prototypicality (Purdie-Vaughns and Eichbach). Here researchers call for more attention to the people who fall into multiple subordinate categories at the same time, whilst calls for more attention for people who are a member of both dominant and subordinate social groups at the same time (Carbado). However, intersectional prototypicality refers to personal characteristics without necessarily being applicable to the political arena, let alone taking policy positions into account.

integration of these theories to a new theoretical framework that explains the ways citizens feel symbolically represented through both descriptive and substantive representation.

Methods

Case and method selection:

Countries

We will study symbolic representation and the way in which descriptive and substantive representation influence racial, religious and gender in-group expectations and evaluations. A comparative design is indispensable to make generalized statements that are bold yet contain adequate nuance (Anthias, 2008; Huddleston, Niessen, & Tjaden, 2013; Saharso & Scholten, 2013). Thanks to the choice of a comparative design, we can explain which similarities are generalizable beyond the selected countries and which idiosyncrasies are explained through national contexts whilst remaining wary of the pitfalls of methodological nationalism (L. Mügge & De Jong, 2013). This exemplifies the usefulness of comparative designs across quite dissimilar countries. We explain similarities in outcomes between countries with generalizable mechanisms that extend beyond the countries we compare, whereas we explain differences in outcomes between countries through unique mechanisms within the countries in question. Furthermore, comparative designs force us to take contextual factors into account. Moreover, similarities across countries will enable generalizations beyond the countries under study, whereas dissimilarities inform caution for nuance.

We selected the Netherlands, Germany and France for this research. These are three large Western-European democracies with similar GDP per capita (Worldbank, 2018), Gini-indices (CIA, 2018), levels of average happiness (UN, 2017), gender gap index (WEForum, 2017). With regard to migration history, all three countries have seen new arrivals of immigrants since the Second World War, geographical group polarization (Vermeulen 2018 Oxford handbook) and similar levels of acceptance of people of different ethnic groups (Alba & Foner, 2015). All three countries have a history of elected parliamentarians espousing xenophobic and particularly Islamophobic rhetoric in their national parliaments (Brubaker, 2013) as well as country leaders who have “decried the failure of multiculturalism” (Vermeulen Oxford book 2018, page 3), although in the case of Germany this has begun more recently (Althof, 2018). Moreover, whereas the three countries have had quite different integration regimes in the past, these are now converging (Alba & Foner, 2015; Joppke, 2007) and integration policies have turned out not to affect ethnic identification in these three countries specifically (Ersanilli & Saharso, 2011).

However, these countries are also very dissimilar. One important difference is their electoral systems. The Netherlands uses party list proportional representation, with preference votes and a threshold of one seat in parliament. Germany is similar in that it uses mixed member proportional representation, with a *first vote* for a direct candidate of their constituency and a *second vote* for party list. There is, however, a threshold of five percent for a political party to enter the Bundestag and elements of a single-member district system. The Dutch and German systems are, nevertheless, quite similar. However, France belongs to a completely different ‘family’ of voting systems with single-member districts and a two-round runoff for national elections (Hague, Harrop, & McCormick,

2016). Despite differences in voting systems and the possibility that this could influence representations of race, religion and gender (Barker & Coffé, 2018) I expect the dependent variables to be largely the same across the countries.

Racial groups

In order to make any statements on perceptions of racial minority groups, we need oversample specific groups (Font & Méndez, 2013, p. 48). We select racial minority groups who report experiencing discrimination in the last twelve months the most (FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017, p. 31) with exception of German citizens with a background in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) who we select to be in line with the Immigrant German Election Study (Goerres et al., 2018) and French citizens with a Turkish background who we select to have a single common national background throughout the countries.

In the Netherlands, the oversample of groups of racial minority citizens will consist of Dutch citizens with a Turkish background, Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background and Dutch citizens with a Surinamese background. Dutch citizens with no migration background will also be sampled in a similar number as the other groups in order to compare and contrast to the other groups.

In Germany, the oversample of groups of racial minority citizens will consist of German citizens with a Turkish background and German citizens with a background in the former Soviet Union. The latter has, however, we argue this group is technically of the same racial group as German citizens with no migration background, but since they hold a unique position in German society as they are considered to be racially German whilst also being relatively recent migrants to the country (Goerres et al., 2018). With this group we can tease out what the difference is between migration background and racial difference. German citizens with no migration background will also be sampled in a similar number as the other groups in order to compare and contrast to the other groups.

In France, the oversample of groups of ethnic minority citizens will consist of French citizens with a North-African background (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria), French citizens with a background in Sub-Saharan African French-speaking countries (Niger, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, French Sudan, Senegal, Chad, Gabon, Cameroon, Congo) and French citizens with a Turkish background. The latter has, however, not been selected on the basis of perceived discrimination or numerical presence, but in order to have one constant category across the three countries of our selection and be able to better study 'transnational communities' (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). French citizens with no migration background will also be sampled in a similar number as the other groups in order to compare and contrast to the other groups.

One challenge worth mentioning is the legal restrictions in all three countries concerning the saving of data on race and ethnicity (GDPR 2017). To overcome these challenges, we will employ a large scale filter question to the Kantar/Lightspeed panels in all three countries. We will ask a very large sample to participate in a mini-survey. The first and only question of this mini-survey asks where their mother and father were born. If either one of their parent are born in a country of interest, we redirect this respondent to the full survey. If they are part of a group we do not want to oversample, either we terminate the sample or redirect a small percentage of the respondents to

the full survey. This will enable us to form sizable groups of ethnic minority citizens for our final survey.

Experimental design

We use an online survey with multidimensional conjoint experiments to operationalize all of our theoretical expectations. Since the introduction of conjoint experiments to the field of political science (Hainmueller et al., 2014), this design has been picked up on widely (Abrajano et al., 2018; Peterson, 2017; Sances, 2018). We will present respondents with profiles of hypothetical politicians in the national parliament and vary information on race, religion, gender and policy position. We will also ask questions about the respondent's own salience of their race, religion, gender and policy positions.

In doing so, we unite each body of literature this research builds upon. First, we operationalize Social Identity Theory's in-group favoritism through congruence between politician and citizen characteristics (Bermeo & Bhatia, 2017; Carlson, 2015; Chauchard, 2016; Kao & Benstead, 2017). Second, we operationalize intersectionality through the acknowledgement that multiple identity categories are mutually reinforcing (Kao & Benstead, 2017, Horiuchi, Smith, & Yamamoto, 2016, p. 30) by analyzing interaction effects. Third, we operationalize System Justification Theory by asking respondents to what extent they agree with a number of policy positions to measure the extent to which the most disadvantaged groups in society favor policy that strengthens the most advantaged groups in society. Fourth, we operationalize Prototypicality Theory through presenting respondents with experimental politician profiles including information on race, religion, gender and policy position and asking questions on the saliency of respondents own race, religion and gender. Fifth, we operationalize Expectancy Violation Theory by asking respondents what policy position politicians to hold while only presenting respondents information on the politician's race, religion and gender.

Experimental designs have distinct advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage is that it is the most suitable method to tease out a causal relationship – the internal validity is high. The main disadvantage, however, is that the external validity is low (Huddleston & Weller, 2017), which we deal with by sampling diligently (Hedlin, 2013), disregard the use of student samples (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) and ensure ample racial diversity within our sample (Coppock & McClellan, 2018; Krupnikov & Levine, 2014; Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman, & Freese, 2015).

Variables:

Independent variables

By means of conjoint experiments, we will ask respondents to evaluate hypothetical politician profiles that we randomize on the basis of race, religion, gender and policy position. The policy positions are either part of the socio-cultural or socio-economic dimension (Van Der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009). We divide the economic dimension into two sub dimensions tapping into issues on redistribution and income inequality on the one hand and green energy and sustainability on the other, while we divide the cultural dimension issues on immigration, integration and Islam on the one hand and gender and sexuality on the other. We construct hypothetical profiles through

complete randomization. An example of a profile is as follows: *“Sebnem Yilmaz has a Turkish background and practices Islam. She says the government should lower the tax rate for the highest incomes”*.

Moderating variables

We measure group saliency in the following ways. We first ask our respondents where their parents were born, which also serves as the filter question to whether respondents participate in the full survey. Later in the survey, we ask our respondents to answer questions about the saliency of their attachment to their ethnic group. We let them choose as many answers as they want out of a long list of possible groups they might identify with. If they pick two or more groups we ask: *Which two ethnic groups are the most important to you? Fill in the most important group to you under 1 and the other one under 2. If you cannot choose between the two, please tick the box “both groups are equally important to me”*. Then they answer the following questions (LISS panel 2009, Threatening Identities module, p.9) about their two most important groups on a scale from 0 to 10: *1. In general, I prefer doing things with [ethnicgroup-1] people. 2. The world would be a much better place if all other groups are like [ethnicgroup-1] people. 3. I don’t think it is good to mix with people from other groups. 4. We should always put [ethnicgroup-1] interests first and not be oversensitive about the interests of others*. We calculate saliency through an additive scale of all four of these answers. If a respondent does not pick the ethnic group derived from their answers to the questions about where their parents were born, we code their saliency as zero. We operationalize saliency of respondent religion in a similar way. We ask respondents about their religious affiliation and irrespective of denomination (Sunni, Shia, Alevi, Protestant, Catholic) we ask all Muslims and Christians to answer the same questions about ethnic identification but then with regard to their chosen religion. Again, we calculate saliency through an additive scale of all four of these answers. We already know whether our respondents identify as male or female and ask them whether they consider themselves to be *“a typical man/woman”* on a scale from 0 to 10.

We also ask respondents what their attitudes are towards a list of eight policy statements (again, on a scale from 0 to 10): *The tax rate for the rich must be lower. Our government should lower the support for the unemployed. Our government should do less to combat climate change than now. Our government needs to lower fuel prices. Immigrants are a burden to our country. Islam should be restricted by law. That men and women receive equal pay for equal work should not be regulated by law. Homosexual couples should not be allowed to adopt children*. The control group sees the exact same statements reversed (i.e. *The tax rate for the rich must be higher instead of lower*). We measure which respondents are the most disadvantaged in two different ways: people who have a low level of education according to country-specific ISCED indicators, people who rate the level of their household income on a scale from 1 to 7 as 1, 2 or 3 and whether they experience any kind of unfair treatment that we perceive as discrimination using The Everyday Discrimination Scale (D. R. Williams, 2016). We ascertain what benefits the most advantaged groups in society by assuming the most advantaged are rich and able to adapt to a green life-style.

We understand a politician to be prototypical if a member of a certain racial group is male, practices the religion that is most common amongst their group (i.e. people with a Turkish background in the Netherlands, Germany and France most often practice Islam) and adheres to one of the following policy positions: *Immigrants are an asset to our country* (cf. FSU Germans). *Islam*

should not be restricted by law (cf. FSU Germans). That men and women receive equal pay for equal work should not be regulated by law. Homosexual couples should not be allowed to adopt children.

However, in order to test Expectancy Violation Theory, we don't want to assume what respondents expect of politicians, we want to ask it out. That is why we also present respondents with politician profiles that only give information on their race, religion and gender. After this we ask them what policy position we expect that politician to stand for. This way we can test the numerical distance between dependent variables when politicians do and do not stand for policy that most respondents expect from them.

Lastly, in order to put Intersectionality to the test we measure whether Intersecting group memberships of both citizen and politician characteristics influence choice and evaluation of politician more than a sum of its parts would suggest. We do so by using interaction effects both between multiple politician profiles, we do the same for citizen characteristics and interact citizen/politician-congruency as well.

Dependent variables

After we present a single politician profile we ask respondents to answer the following three questions on a scale from 0 to 10: *Do you think this politician represents you? How much do you trust this politician? How capable do you think this politician is to perform well on the job?* We repeat this by presenting another politician profile and asking the same three questions. Then we ask respondents to choose between one of the two profiles by asking *Which politician are you most likely to vote for?*

Paper 6. The influence of ethnicity, religion and gender on preference votes

Introduction

Do women, ethnic and religious minorities cast more preference votes for candidates with whom they share characteristics? To what extent does group identification, experiences with discrimination moderate outcomes? Research that studies this is few and far between. The flexible list proportional representation system is the most common across Europe, but also one of the least understood (André, Depauw, Shugart, & Chytilék, 2017). As personalization in politics is increasing (Karvonen 2010) we need to understand an important element of flexible list proportional representation: preference voting. Although the literature contends that the effects of preference votes is institutionally limited (Karvonen, 2004), the effects might have a lagged effect (Folke, Persson, & Rickne, 2016) and influential voices are calling to increase the weight that is attributed to preference votes (Remkes, 2018). Nevertheless, institutional influence doesn't seem to be the goal in the minds of most voters: voters see it as a way to express their preferences and be heard (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg 2012, p.183).

Although people across Europe discuss the effect of ethnic minority voters on preference votes, not much research has been done on this. We only know of research on preference votes that distinguishes between European and non-European voters (André et al 2013, Nagtezaam 2019). To formulate our hypotheses, we draw from the field of minority representation (Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 2013; Celis & Mügge, 2018a; Mügge & Erzeel, 2016; Saalfeld & Bischof, 2013) and candidate experiments that include a shared identification perspective (Aguilar, Cunow, & Desposato, 2015; Bermeo & Bhatia, 2017; Carlson, 2015; Chauchard, 2016; Kao & Benstead, 2017; Lerman & Sadin, 2016; Philpot & Walton, 2007). We expect, as perceived representation is low and shared identification drives vote choice of ethnic and racial minorities but not that of women, that ethnic minorities will be more inclined to vote for a member of their own group while women are not necessarily inclined to vote for women. Although research on religious affiliation driving preference votes is limited (cf. Azabar, Thijssen, & Van Erkel, forthcoming), we believe that this will drive preference votes as well, given the high level of cognitive connectedness amongst Muslims in Europe (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2009). However, it must be noted that evaluations of ethnic and religious minority citizens are anything but straightforward, leading to feelings of hope and betrayal (Akachar, 2018; Akachar, Celis, & Severs, 2017) as representatives often need to walk a tight rope of being deemed either a "Race Man or Sellout" (Anderson, 1997).

We study this through a large-scale survey with an oversample of the largest ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands, Germany and France. Although all three countries have differing systems with regards to election system and preference votes, we ask all respondents in all three countries to which extent their vote for a specific person was incited by either their ethnic group, gender, religion, policy or functioning. In the Netherlands we ask this both for people who voted for the first person on the list as well as people who cast a preference vote for any other candidate. In Germany we ask this question to people who voted only for a party, to which extent was their vote inspired by the demographic background of the leader of that party? In France, a district system, we ask respondents whether their vote was inspired by the party or by any characteristics of the member that was up for office in their specific district.

This way we not only get to the heart of preference voting, but also see how voting systems influence how demographics play a role in vote choice as institutional changes are in sight (Remkes, 2018). We need to understand the dynamics surrounding preference voting. Awareness of how voters choose candidates is indispensable as it influences who gains political power and who does not. In addition, it impinges directly on our core democratic principles. Notions of representation influence perceived responsiveness and subsequent external efficacy (Esaiasson et al., 2015) which, in turn, goes on to form political and institutional trust (Hakhverdian & Mayne, 2012; Mishler & Rose, 2001). Electoral behaviour is more than just a prerequisite for gaining political power, it tells us how our representative democracy is functioning.

Theory

An important main question that the field of minority representation deals with is whether demographics are reflected in representative democracies. Instead of seeing ethnic minorities as immigrants or newcomers, ethnic minorities are seen as “established populations” (Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 2013, p. 564) with distinct policy preferences and attitudes (Bird, 2005; Kranendonk & Vermeulen, 2018; Tiberj & Michon, 2013) worthy of political representation. Irrespective of whether descriptive representation does or does not lead to substantive representation, many normative theorists elaborate extensively on the importance of matching representative politics to demographic characteristics of the society in question (Dahlerup, 1988; Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995; Weldon, 2002; Williams, 2000; Young, 2000). However, these authors mostly focus on the representation of women and give mostly normative arguments for the importance of matching demographics to descriptive representation. The field of minority representation broadens the scope to ethnicity and puts this question to the test, empirically. For instance, through the creation of the “Minority Women Legislative Index (MWLI)” (Hughes, 2013, p. 489) which unearths the underrepresentation of minority women relative to their share of the population worldwide, thus empirically underlining the relevance of studying minority representation.

Comparative research points to the importance of “citizenship regimes” and other “institutional features” in enhancing the congruence between minorities’ demographics and their democratic representation (Bird, 2005, p. 425). The strategies political parties employ to increase ethnic diversity matter (Sobolewska, 2013) and features of the electoral system create possibilities for the underrepresented to gain access (Geese & Schacht, 2018; Michon & Vermeulen, 2013). More specifically, comparative research shows that systems with proportional representation enhances the number of Muslim members of parliament in western countries (Hughes, 2016, p. 548). Moreover, research on proportional democracies shows that some political parties have a preference for ethnic minority women because of ticking two diversity boxes at once (Celis & Erzeel, 2017; Celis, Erzeel, & Mügge, 2015b).

Once minorities gain access to representative politics, another question arises: *does descriptive representation lead to substantive representation* (using the terminology of Pitkin, 1967)? With other words: which policy outcomes reflect the interests of groups of citizens? Mainly from the field of representation of women, two distinct schools of thought exist with regard to this question. The first school of thought postulates that descriptive representation leads to substantive representation (Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995; M. S. Williams, 2000; Young, 2000) whereas the

second school of thought argues the opposite: descriptive representation does not necessarily lead to substantive representation (Dahlerup, 1988; Dovi, 2002; Weldon, 2002). Researchers in the field of minority representation study this question as well. For instance, through studying parliamentary questions put forward by ethnic minority representatives (Saalfeld & Bischof, 2013). It turns out that both ethnic minority and ethnic majority politicians reach substantive representation of ethnic minorities, if they are from ethnically diverse constituencies.

Evaluations of ethnic minority citizens are anything but straightforward (Akachar, 2018; Akachar et al., 2017). This points to a “disconnect” between “exceptionally assimilated minorities” and the “ordinary classes of ethnic minorities they are supposed to represent” (Bird, 2005, p. 439)? Or, is it irreconcilable “informal and formal rules and norms” in “networks of the dominant group” (Mügge & Erzeel, 2016, p. 503)? Or, is it a product of “power threat” within groups of people who know functions and seats are limited (Hindriks, Verkuyten, & Coenders, 2017)? Again, candidate choice experiments offer a fruitful way to elaborate further on possible explanations of hope and betrayal by eliciting in which instances either feeling is brought about. This dynamic would limit the inclination of ethnic and religious minorities to cast preference votes on minority citizens.

A common pitfall of employing either a “focus on ‘women’ (read: white) as a group” or a focus “on ‘minorities’ (read: male)” (Emejulu & Mügge, 2018, p. 44) leaves important questions unanswered (Cole, 2009, p. 172). An intersectional perspective acknowledges that “identity categories” such as “race, class, gender, sexuality, age, disability, ethnicity, nation, and religion, among others...”⁵ (Collins & Bilge, 2016, pp. 26–27) are “more than the sum of mutually exclusive parts” (Hancock, 2007, p. 65) and are, in fact, “mutually reinforcing” (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1283). We believe we need to scrutinize the intersectional position of both the candidate and the voter. In doing so, we deepen our understanding of the intersectional relationship between both the citizen and politician.

What has intersectionality brought to the field of minority representation as of yet? Researchers find Muslim women are elected more often “in countries with proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, whereas Muslim ethnic minority men have been elected across a range of electoral systems” (Hughes, 2016, p. 548), this study does not take into account the effect of preference voting, even though this is often possible in PR electoral systems. “Multiple advantage” explanations from PR contexts are, first, that in some cases ethnic minority women turn out to benefit from the women’s networks within political parties, which are seen as less “threatening” than networks based on ethnicity (Mügge & Damstra, 2013, p. 353). Second, ethnic minority women are seen as “well-integrated” and therefore better “role models” than men (Mügge & Damstra, 2013, p. 354). Third, it is argued that ethnic minority women can also be seen as a desirable choice for party elites who want to maximize representability with politicians who “complement” the incumbents as much as possible (Celis & Erzeel, 2017; Celis, Erzeel, Mügge, & Damstra, 2014; Celis et al., 2015b). Nevertheless, the “multiple advantage” these researchers find is not understood to be a *fixed* fact, it really depends on *contextual factors*: the views on equality that dominant political parties hold and the position the ethnic minority group holds in society (Mügge, 2016) influence the process of representation greatly. In sum, an intersectional lens is indispensable

⁵ I follow a broad reading of intersectionality in which whiteness, masculinity and heterosexuality also intersect to complicate and nuance not only marginalized identities but also dominant ones, in line with Carbadó (Carbadó, 2013).

to understanding minority representation. Whereas the current generation of researchers answer these questions from the perspective of party elites, candidate choice experiments open avenues to answer these questions from the perspective of the citizen.

A comparative perspective that reaches across contexts creates more understanding (Schönwälder, 2013) as comparative studies in the past have shown (e.g. Bird, 2005; Bloemraad, 2013; Hughes, 2013). Whereas these earlier studies have mostly focused on the proportion of minorities in representative bodies relative to the proportion of the same minorities in the general population, an analysis of preference votes offers new insights as well.

We know from candidate experiments that racial minorities are more likely to vote for candidates that share the same race as them. Philpot and Walton (2007) examine whether the voter's race matters in candidate experiments and find that, on average, black voters are 21.5 percent more likely to vote for a black candidate than white voters (p. 55). Lerman and Sadin (2016) present similar findings. They find that white voters hardly differentiate between white and black candidates, whereas black voters favour black candidates significantly more often than white voters favour white candidates (p. 153).

Outside of the western context, two studies explicitly study 'co-ethnicity'. Chauchard's (2016) data from India suggest co-ethnicity matters significantly. Compared to the ratings of a friendly out-group candidate, respondents significantly more often prefer the in-group candidate. Carlson's (2015) findings in Uganda – she pits the effect sizes of being 'co-ethnic' against many other factors – are similar. Candidates who held prior office receive the most positive ratings, closely followed by co-ethnicity and having a positive track record. It turns out that co-ethnicity and track record interact significantly. Other candidate attributes such as education do not matter in any of the models. Aguilar et al. (2015) study the effect of ballot length on Brazilian voters who share racial characteristics with candidates up for election. When respondents evaluate a short ballot, with three candidates only, 'white' and 'brown' respondents do not necessarily favour racially congruent candidates whereas 'black' respondents do. As the ballot length increases, all racial groups tend to favour racially congruent candidates. Bermeo and Bhatia (2017) find their Afghan respondents strongly favour candidates from their own ethnic group. They tested interaction effects between respondent/candidate age, income, ethnicity and education and find that only ethnicity produces a significant effect, and a strong one at that. Kao and Benstead (2017) study the conditions under which voters prefer female candidates in Jordan. They find that, on the whole, women are disadvantaged at the ballot box. However, sharing the same ethnicity with a candidate closes the gender gap completely. This means that (mostly male) respondents who would otherwise not choose a female candidate will do so if they share the same ethnic identification. The authors call this surprising in light of the patriarchal inclinations of tribal societies and point to the importance of an intersectional (Cho, Crenshaw, & McCall, 2013; Collins, 1998; Hughes, 2016) understanding of the dynamics of voting behaviour (pp. 31–32).

Does this apply to gender as well? In other words, is there a gender affinity effect (Dolan, 2008)? Despite extensive analyses across studies, respondent/candidate gender congruence does not yield significant results. Women do not tend to vote for women. In fact, research shows that male respondents are the drivers of the slight positive bias towards female candidates.

We have ascertained that candidate experiments point to a distinct favouring of racial in-groups when it comes to minority voters, whereas gender does not reveal the same dynamic. But does this also extend to non-experimental voting behaviour? English, Pearson, and Strolovitch (2018), using (non-experimental) surveys to study attitudes towards Members of Congress and other representative bodies in the United States, find that race and gender operate with completely different dynamics. What does other non-experimental data say about the effects of shared racial and gender identification?

First, women voters do not appear to favour female candidates. We find mixed results for a 'gender affinity effect' outside of experimental research as well (Dolan, 2008). Male voters more often appear to favour male candidates. But after accounting for political knowledge, education and party affiliation, the effect of male-to-male-favouritism diminishes (English et al., 2018, p. 14). However, when controlling for 'structural inequalities at the supply side', Van Erkel (2019, p. 57) finds slight female-to-female favouritism in preferential voting. Other non-experimental research does not find female-to-female favouritism, but does find male-to-male favouritism. Erzeel and Caluwaerts (2015) suggest that this is due to an individual's political resources and party affiliation: 'Politically disengaged and right wing/populist' male voters account for most of this effect (p. 267). District-level data, such as Giger et al. (2014), suggest that electoral contexts such as district magnitude (how many candidates can a voter choose from?) and gender ratios in party lists account for male-to-male favouritism (p. 303), whereas comparisons between low- and high-information elections suggest that the effect of the electoral context is negligible (De Leeuw, 2017). In sum, not only experimental but also non-experimental data suggest that shared gender identification does not have a large effect on women's voting behaviour. Although it may have an effect on the voting behaviour of men, this conclusion appears to be contingent on many factors.

Second, voters appear to favour candidates of the same racial group. In real-life voting, women are much less likely than blacks to 'vote as a bloc' (Tate, 2003, p. 64; van der Zwan, Tolsma, & Lubbers, 2020). This is not a new finding; nor is it confined to voting behaviour as 'race trumps gender' in attitude formation as well (Mansbridge & Tate, 1992). We find that comparisons between experimental and non-experimental data point to shared racial identification in a similar fashion (Philpot & Walton, 2007). Indeed, black voters favour black candidates over their white counterparts (Stout & Le, 2017). Although this co-racial preference holds irrespective of whether they share a party affiliation (Tate, 2003, pp. 113–131), Democratic Party affiliation in the US also remains a major driver of voting behaviour (Kidd, Diggs, Farooq, & Murray, 2007). Nevertheless, a majority of highly engaged black voters stated 'race' as the most important reason to vote for Barack Obama in the 2008 primaries (Sullivan & Johnson, 2008, p. 59). The effect of shared racial identification increased after a number of public figures made 'racially insensitive comments', pointing to the importance of racial solidarity (p. 60) as a driver of voting choice in addition to stereotyping as a heuristic for the candidates' policy positions (p.61). The chance of descriptive representation increases the turnout rates of 'co-ethnics' (Miller & Chaturvedi, 2018) and 'blacks' (Whitby, 2007) alike. Shared racial identification matters in both experimental and non-experimental settings and drives voters' choices in numerous ways. That is why we expect that this will extend to preference voting as well.

Moreover, religion is 'interconnected' with dynamics of race and gender in politics (e.g. Scrinzi, 2017, p. 87). However, researchers using candidate experiments rarely include religion as an

attribute. We call for the inclusion of religion, especially Islam. Given the rise of Islamophobia in many parts of the world (Helbling & Traunmüller, 2017; Taras, 2013), religion is becoming increasingly salient in politics. Muslim politicians are criticised for their religion by some, and embraced by others (Azabar et al., forthcoming). Islam and gender furthermore reinforce each other intersectionally when embodied by politicians: whereas Muslim men are often deemed threats (Verkuyten, Hindriks, & Coenders, 2016), Muslim women are often seen as models of successful integration (Celis, Erzeel, & Mügge, 2015). Beyond attitudes of the (assumed) white majority towards Muslim candidates, Muslim voter/candidate congruency is rarely the focus of research (cf. Heath, Verniers, & Kumar, 2015), let alone in interaction with race and gender.

Hypothesis: In light of unequal (perceived) minority representation, we expect ethnic and religious minority citizens to cast preference votes for candidates of their own group, whereas we do not expect women to exert preference votes for women. We expect this effect to be stronger amongst women, ethnic and religious minorities who identify strongly with their group and who have experienced discrimination that they attribute to their ethnicity, religion and/or gender.

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