Dear all,
This Thursday we will have our next LIRa session.
Speaker: Zainab Bakhtiari
Date and Time: Thursday, March 22nd 2018, 16:00-17:30
Venue: ILLC Seminar Room F1.15, Science Park 107.
Title: How does uncertainty about other voters determine a strategic
vote?
Abstract. In this talk, we discuss a framework for strategic voting
when a voter may lack knowledge about the preferences of other
voters, or about other voters\' knowledge about her own
preference. In this setting, we define notions of manipulation,
equilibrium, and dominance, under uncertainty. We provide scenarios
wherein the profile of true preferences is the same but the
equilibrium profiles are different because the voters have different
knowledge about other voters. We also model actions that change such
uncertainty about preferences, such as a voter revealing her
preference. We show that some forms of manipulation and equilibrium
are preserved under such uncertainty updates and others not. We then
formalize epistemic voting terminology in a logic. Our aim is to
provide the epistemic background for the analysis and design of voting
rules that incorporate uncertainty.
.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team