ILLC-LIRa December 2020

illc-lira@list.uva.nl

1 participants
5 discussions

correction: Workshop on Logics of Agency, Counterfactuals and Norms
by LIRa Seminar 11 Dec '20

11 Dec '20

Dear all, This is to make a correction on the schedule of the Workshop on Logics of Agency, Counterfactuals and Norms, announced earlier today. The change concerns the afternoon session of the workshop. The workshop will take place on Monday, December 14th 2020 from 09:50 to 12:50 and from ** 15:20 to 18:20 **. We will continue with virtual drinks until 18.50. The zoom details remain as in the previous e-mail. Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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Workshop on Logics of Agency, Counterfactuals and Norms
by LIRa Seminar 11 Dec '20

11 Dec '20

Dear all, The workshop on Logics of Agency, Counterfactuals and Norms will take place on Monday, December 14th 2020 from 09:50 to 12:50 and from 15:00 to 18:00. The workshop is associated to the PhD defense of Ilaria Canavotto. All details can be found on the workshop website: https://sites.google.com/view/lacn-workshop You are welcome to join, using the recurring LIRa zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/92907704256?pwd=anY3WkFmQVhLZGhjT2JXMlhjQVl1dz09 (Meeting ID: 929 0770 4256, Passcode: 036024). Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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LIRa session: Konstantin Genin
by LIRa Seminar 09 Dec '20

09 Dec '20

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow. We will use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/92907704256?pwd=anY3WkFmQVhLZGhjT2JXMlhjQVl1dz09 (Meeting ID: 929 0770 4256, Passcode: 036024). You can find the details below. Speaker: Konstantin Genin (Research Group: Epistemology and Ethics of Machine Learning in the Cluster of Excellence – Machine Learning for Science at the University of Tübingen) Date and Time: Thursday, December 10th 2020, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam time. Venue: online. Title: Simplicity and Scientific Progress Abstract. A major goal of twentieth-century philosophy of science was to show how science could make progress toward the truth even if, at any moment, our best theories are false. To that end, Popper and others tried to develop a theory of truthlikeness, hoping to prove that theories get closer to the truth over time. That program encountered several notable setbacks. I propose the following: a method for answering an empirical question is progressive if the chance of outputting the true answer is strictly increasing with sample size. Surprisingly, many standard statistical methods are not even approximately progressive. What\'s worse, many problems do not admit strictly progressive solutions. However, I prove that it is often possible to approximate progressiveness arbitrarily well. Furthermore, every approximately progressive method must obey a version of Ockham’s razor. So it turns out that addressing the problem of progress uncovers a solution to another perennial problem: how can we give a non-circular argument for preferring simple theories when the truth may well be complex? Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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LIRa session: Konstantin Genin
by LIRa Seminar 06 Dec '20

06 Dec '20

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, December 10th. You can find the details of the talk below. We will use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/92907704256?pwd=anY3WkFmQVhLZGhjT2JXMlhjQVl1dz09 (Meeting ID: 929 0770 4256, Passcode: 036024). Speaker: Konstantin Genin (Research Group: Epistemology and Ethics of Machine Learning in the Cluster of Excellence – Machine Learning for Science at the University of Tübingen) Date and Time: Thursday, December 10th 2020, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam time. Venue: online. Title: Simplicity and Scientific Progress Abstract. A major goal of twentieth-century philosophy of science was to show how science could make progress toward the truth even if, at any moment, our best theories are false. To that end, Popper and others tried to develop a theory of truthlikeness, hoping to prove that theories get closer to the truth over time. That program encountered several notable setbacks. I propose the following: a method for answering an empirical question is progressive if the chance of outputting the true answer is strictly increasing with sample size. Surprisingly, many standard statistical methods are not even approximately progressive. What\'s worse, many problems do not admit strictly progressive solutions. However, I prove that it is often possible to approximate progressiveness arbitrarily well. Furthermore, every approximately progressive method must obey a version of Ockham’s razor. So it turns out that addressing the problem of progress uncovers a solution to another perennial problem: how can we give a non-circular argument for preferring simple theories when the truth may well be complex? Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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LIRa/GroLog Logic Afternoon
by LIRa Seminar 02 Dec '20

02 Dec '20

Dear all, We will have our joint LIRa/GroLog session tomorrow, starting at 15:30 (Amsterdam time). You can find the schedule and the details of the talks below. We will use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/92907704256?pwd=anY3WkFmQVhLZGhjT2JXMlhjQVl1dz09 (Meeting ID: 929 0770 4256, Passcode: 036024). Speakers: Zoé Christoff (University of Groningen) and Aybüke Özgün (University of Amsterdam) Date and Time: Thursday, December 3rd 2020, 15:30-17:30, Amsterdam time. Schedule: 15:30 Arrival 15:45 First talk 16:30 Break 16:45 Second talk 17:30 Drinks Venue: online. Zoé Christoff: Group Knowledge in Epistemic Logic with Names (joint work with Marta Bílková and Olivier Roy) In many situations, we refer to a group of agents using a label, say \"Trump supporters\" or \"trolls\", without knowing exactly who the members of the group are. Sometimes, we even fail to know whether we, ourselves, are members of a given group. Yet, epistemic logic typically comes with the simplifying assumption that group membership is common knowledge among the entire population. In 1993 already, Grove and Halpern introduced a generalized epistemic logic relaxing this assumption and replacing the usual indexes to denote agents with abstract names that can have different referents, both individuals or groups, in different possible worlds. In that generalized framework, they replace the standard K_i modalities with modalities of the form S_n and E_n, for \"someone with name n knows\" and \"everyone with name n knows\", respectively. In our current work, we discuss extensions of this generalized logic with group modalities for common knowledge and distributed knowledge. Reference: A. J. Grove and J. Y. Halpern. Naming and Identity in Epistemic Logics Part I: The Propositional Case. Journal of Logic and Computation, 3(4):345–378, 08, 1993. Aybüke Özgün: Uncertainty about Evidence We develop a logical framework for reasoning about knowledge and evidence in which the agent may be uncertain about how to interpret their evidence. Rather than representing an evidential state as a fixed subset of the state space, our models allow the set of possible worlds that a piece of evidence corresponds to to vary from one possible world to another, and therefore itself be the subject of uncertainty. Such structures can be viewed as (epistemically motivated) generalizations of topological spaces. In this context, there arises a natural distinction between what is actually entailed by the evidence and what the agent knows is entailed by the evidence---with the latter, in general, being much weaker. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the corresponding bi-modal logic of knowledge and evidence entailment, and investigate some natural extensions of this core system, including the addition of a belief modality and its interaction with evidence interpretation and entailment, and the addition of a “knowability\" modality interpreted via a (generalized) interior operator. This is joint work with Adam Bjorndahl. Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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ILLC-LIRa December 2020