ILLC-LIRa December 2021

illc-lira@list.uva.nl

2 participants
6 discussions

LIRa Session: Branden Fitelson (tomorrow, Thursday, 16 December 16:30)
by LIRa Seminar 15 Dec '21

15 Dec '21

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 16 December 16:30. Please use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09 (Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984) You can find the details of the talk below. Speaker: Branden Fitelson (Northeastern University, Boston) Date and Time: Thursday, December 16th 2021, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam time. Venue: online. Title: Probabilities of Conditionals & Conditional Probabilities --- Revisited Abstract. Lewis's (1976) triviality argument against The Equation (a.k.a, Adams's Thesis) rests on an implausibly strong presupposition about the nature of (epistemic) rational requirements. Interestingly, Lewis (1980) later rejected this presupposition. In his discussion of the Principal Principle, Lewis assumes something weaker, and more reasonable, about the nature of rational requirements. In this paper, I explain how to apply the insights of Lewis (1980) to repair Lewis's earlier (1976) discussion. This leads to a more reasonable rendition of The Equation --- one which is (a) immune from triviality, and (b) a better candidate for a (bona fide) rational requirement. Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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LIRa Session: Branden Fitelson (Thursday, 16 December 16:30)
by LIRa Seminar 10 Dec '21

10 Dec '21

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, 16 December 16:30. Please use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09 (Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984) You can find the details of the talk below. Speaker: Branden Fitelson (Northeastern University, Boston) Date and Time: Thursday, December 16th 2021, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam time. Venue: online. Title: Probabilities of Conditionals & Conditional Probabilities --- Revisited Abstract. Lewis's (1976) triviality argument against The Equation (a.k.a, Adams's Thesis) rests on an implausibly strong presupposition about the nature of (epistemic) rational requirements. Interestingly, Lewis (1980) later rejected this presupposition. In his discussion of the Principal Principle, Lewis assumes something weaker, and more reasonable, about the nature of rational requirements. In this paper, I explain how to apply the insights of Lewis (1980) to repair Lewis's earlier (1976) discussion. This leads to a more reasonable rendition of The Equation --- one which is (a) immune from triviality, and (b) a better candidate for a (bona fide) rational requirement. Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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LIRa Session: Giorgio Sbardolini (tomorrow, Thursday, 9 December 16:30)
by LIRa Seminar 08 Dec '21

08 Dec '21

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 9 December 16:30. Please use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09 (Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984) You can find the details of the talk below. Speaker: Giorgio Sbardolini Date and Time: Thursday, December 9th 2021, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam time. Venue: online. Title: Coordination without Common Knowledge Abstract. It is fairly well understood how rational agents coordinate by means of common knowledge. At least occasionally, we are rational, and we coordinate. Even so, often it doesn’t seem that we coordinate by reasoning about what we both know (and we know that we know and so on). Sometimes we coordinate without common knowledge, but how? I’ll present some work in progress in which I try to make sense of a weak notion of rationality on which coordination without common knowledge is rational. I will present two (tentative) ways of making sense of this idea: one using Iterated Best Response reasoning and one using Dynamic Epistemic Actions. The two approaches are not equivalent, and I’m also interested in what connections there might be between these two ways of studying rational action. Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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LIRa Session: Giorgio Sbardolini (Thursday, 9 December 16:30)
by LIRa Seminar 06 Dec '21

06 Dec '21

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, 9 December 16:30. Please use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09 (Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984) You can find the details of the talk below. Speaker: Giorgio Sbardolini Date and Time: Thursday, December 9th 2021, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam time. Venue: online. Title: Coordination without Common Knowledge Abstract. It is fairly well understood how rational agents coordinate by means of common knowledge. At least occasionally, we are rational, and we coordinate. Even so, often it doesn’t seem that we coordinate by reasoning about what we both know (and we know that we know and so on). Sometimes we coordinate without common knowledge, but how? I’ll present some work in progress in which I try to make sense of a weak notion of rationality on which coordination without common knowledge is rational. I will present two (tentative) ways of making sense of this idea: one using Iterated Best Response reasoning and one using Dynamic Epistemic Actions. The two approaches are not equivalent, and I’m also interested in what connections there might be between these two ways of studying rational action. Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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LIRa Related Talk: DIEP Seminar (tomorrow, Thursday, 2 December 11:00)
by LIRa Seminar 01 Dec '21

01 Dec '21

Dear all, The following LIRa related talk might be of interest to some of you: This Thursday, the 2nd of December at 11am we have a DIEP seminar by Tomas Veloz (Centre Leo Apostel): Title: Reaction Networks and Evolutionary Game Theory Abstract: Mathematical approaches in systems biology are increasingly applied beyond the scope of biology. Particularly, reaction networks have been suggested as an alternative way to model systems of a general kind, and particularly social phenomena. In this latter “socio-chemical metaphor” molecular species play the role of agents’ decisions and their outcomes, and chemical reactions play the role of interactions among these decisions. From here, it is possible to study the dynamical properties of social systems using standard tools of biochemical modelling. In this talk we show how reaction networks can model systems that are usually studied via evolutionary game theory. We illustrate our framework by modeling the repeated prisoners’ dilemma. We further develop a model considering the interaction among Tit for Tat and Defector agents. We will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the approach as well as its potential to produce new insights in classical problems such as the emergence of goal-directedness and the evolution of cooperation. Zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/85608909905 The LIRa team

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LIRa Session: Adam Brandenburger (tomorrow, Thursday, 2 December 16:30)
by LIRa Seminar 01 Dec '21

01 Dec '21

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 2 December 16:30. Please use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09 (Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984) You can find the details of the talk below. Speaker: Adam Brandenburger Date and Time: Thursday, December 2nd 2021, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam time. Venue: online. Title: Agreement and Disagreement in a Non-Classical World Abstract. The Agreement Theorem (Aumann, 1976) states that if two Bayesian agents start with a common prior, then they cannot have common knowledge that they hold different posterior probabilities of some underlying event of interest. In short, the two agents cannot "agree to disagree." This result applies in the classical domain where classical probability theory applies. But in non-classical domains (such as the quantum world), classical probability theory does not apply, and so we cannot assume that the same result holds when agents observe non-classical phenomena. Inspired by their use in quantum mechanics, we employ signed probability measures ("quasi-probabilities") to investigate the epistemics of the non-classical world and ask, in particular: What conditions lead to agreement or allow for disagreement when agents may use signed probabilities? by Adam Brandenburger, Patricia Contreras-Tejada, Pierfrancesco La Mura, Giannicola Scarpa, and Kai Steverson Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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ILLC-LIRa December 2021