ILLC-LIRa February 2021

illc-lira@list.uva.nl

1 participants
8 discussions

LIRa Session: Frederik Van De Putte
by LIRa Seminar 26 Feb '21

26 Feb '21

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, March 4th. Our speaker is Frederik Van De Putte. You can find the details of the talk below. We will use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/92907704256?pwd=anY3WkFmQVhLZGhjT2JXMlhjQVl1dz09 (Meeting ID: 929 0770 4256, Passcode: 036024). Speaker: Frederik Van De Putte Date and Time: Thursday, March 4th 2021, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam time. Venue: online. Title: The Problem of No Hands: Responsibility Voids in Collective Decisions. Abstract. The problem of no hands concerns the existence of so-called responsibility voids: cases where a group makes a certain decision, yet no individual member of the group can be held responsible for this decision. Criteria-based collective decision procedures play a central role in philosophical debates on responsibility voids. In particular, the well-known discursive dilemma has been used to argue for the existence of these voids. But there is no consensus: others argue that no such voids exist in the discursive dilemma under the assumption that casting an untruthful opinion is eligible. We argue that, under this assumption, the procedure used in the discursive dilemma is indeed immune to responsibility voids, yet such voids can still arise for other criteria-based procedures. We provide two general characterizations of the conditions under which criteria-based collective decision procedures are immune to these voids. Our general characterizations are used to prove that responsibility voids are ruled out by criteria-based procedures involving an atomistic or monotonic decision function. In addition, we show that our results imply various other insights concerning the logic of responsibility voids. This is joint work with Hein Duijf. Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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LIRa Session: Sven Rosenkranz
by LIRa Seminar 24 Feb '21

24 Feb '21

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow. We will use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/92907704256?pwd=anY3WkFmQVhLZGhjT2JXMlhjQVl1dz09 (Meeting ID: 929 0770 4256, Passcode: 036024). You can find the details below. Speaker: Sven Rosenkranz Date and Time: Thursday, February 25th 2021, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam time. Venue: online. Title: To be in no position to know to be in no position to know: methods, safety, and luminosity. Abstract. To the best of my knowledge, no epistemic logician seriously entertains the thought that negative introspection holds: clearly, some cases of ignorance go unnoticed. By contrast, many epistemic logicians seem unfazed by extant arguments against positive introspection and continue working with logics at least as strong as S4. There are arguments against positive introspection that rely on the fact that knowledge implies belief. Such arguments can be defused by recasting positive introspection in terms of the factive notion of being in a position to know, where to be in a position to know p, one needn’t believe p. Knowledge requires safe belief, and being in a position to know accordingly requires being in a position to safely believe. There are powerful safety- based arguments against positive introspection, even in its revised formulation. I will not here rehearse these arguments. Instead, I will argue for the claim that the safety requirement poses no threat to ¬K¬Kp → K¬K¬Kp, where ‘K’ is short for ‘One is in a position to know that’. If ¬K¬Kp → K¬K¬Kp holds, ¬K¬Kp encodes a luminous condition. The lead idea driving the argument is that methods for telling if ¬Kp holds are best seen as being functionally dependent on the best methods for telling if p holds, and as being lopsided in that they are not, at the same time, methods for telling if Kp holds. Accordingly, I must say a lot about methods first. Elsewhere I have argued that ¬K¬Kp is necessary and sufficient for one’s having propositional justification for p. If ¬K¬Kp → K¬K¬Kp can be upheld, then this implies that having propositional justification is a luminous condition – an idea that internalists typically cherish but struggle to substantiate. The lesson for the epistemic logician, if any, is that systems weaker than S4 should be devised that accommodate the luminosity of ¬K¬Kp. . Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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LIRa Session: Sven Rosenkranz
by LIRa Seminar 19 Feb '21

19 Feb '21

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, February 25th. Our speaker is Sven Rosenkranz. You can find the details of the talk below. We will use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/92907704256?pwd=anY3WkFmQVhLZGhjT2JXMlhjQVl1dz09 (Meeting ID: 929 0770 4256, Passcode: 036024). Speaker: Sven Rosenkranz Date and Time: Thursday, February 25th 2021, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam time. Venue: online. Title: To be in no position to know to be in no position to know: methods, safety, and luminosity. Abstract. To the best of my knowledge, no epistemic logician seriously entertains the thought that negative introspection holds: clearly, some cases of ignorance go unnoticed. By contrast, many epistemic logicians seem unfazed by extant arguments against positive introspection and continue working with logics at least as strong as S4. There are arguments against positive introspection that rely on the fact that knowledge implies belief. Such arguments can be defused by recasting positive introspection in terms of the factive notion of being in a position to know, where to be in a position to know p, one needn’t believe p. Knowledge requires safe belief, and being in a position to know accordingly requires being in a position to safely believe. There are powerful safety- based arguments against positive introspection, even in its revised formulation. I will not here rehearse these arguments. Instead, I will argue for the claim that the safety requirement poses no threat to ¬K¬Kp → K¬K¬Kp, where ‘K’ is short for ‘One is in a position to know that’. If ¬K¬Kp → K¬K¬Kp holds, ¬K¬Kp encodes a luminous condition. The lead idea driving the argument is that methods for telling if ¬Kp holds are best seen as being functionally dependent on the best methods for telling if p holds, and as being lopsided in that they are not, at the same time, methods for telling if Kp holds. Accordingly, I must say a lot about methods first. Elsewhere I have argued that ¬K¬Kp is necessary and sufficient for one’s having propositional justification for p. If ¬K¬Kp → K¬K¬Kp can be upheld, then this implies that having propositional justification is a luminous condition – an idea that internalists typically cherish but struggle to substantiate. The lesson for the epistemic logician, if any, is that systems weaker than S4 should be devised that accommodate the luminosity of ¬K¬Kp. . Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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LIRa Session: Marija Slavkovik
by LIRa Seminar 17 Feb '21

17 Feb '21

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LIRa Session: Marija Slavkovik
by LIRa Seminar 12 Feb '21

12 Feb '21

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, February 18th. Our speaker is Marija Slavkovik. You can find the details of the talk below. We will use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/92907704256?pwd=anY3WkFmQVhLZGhjT2JXMlhjQVl1dz09 (Meeting ID: 929 0770 4256, Passcode: 036024). Speaker: Marija Slavkovik Date and Time: Thursday, February 18th 2021, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam time. Venue: online. Title: Conflicts in machine ethics. Abstract. Machine ethics is concerned with the problem of automating moral reasoning. Specifically, given a set of options in a context and some information on which moral values or obligations are to be enforced, how to compute what is to be done by a machine? The obvious challenge of machine ethics is often considered to be: what should a machine never do? But that is the wrong question. A less obvious one is: who should decide what a machine should never do? And for people who understand collective decision-making: how? Moral values and moral obligations tend to be ambiguously specified affairs. Furthermore, people have different views when it comes to morality. All this spells: conflicts. Conflicting views must be resolved as part of automating moral reasoning. Drawing on past and ongoing work I discuss three approaches to resolving conflicts when they are represented as logic inconsistencies: argumentation, social choice and normative conflict resolution. Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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LIRa Session: Elise Perrotin
by LIRa Seminar 10 Feb '21

10 Feb '21

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LIRa Session: Elise Perrotin
by LIRa Seminar 05 Feb '21

05 Feb '21

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, February 11th. Our speaker is Elise Perrotin. You can find the details of the talk below. We will use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/92907704256?pwd=anY3WkFmQVhLZGhjT2JXMlhjQVl1dz09 (Meeting ID: 929 0770 4256, Passcode: 036024). Speaker: Elise Perrotin Date and Time: Thursday, February 11th 2021, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam time. Venue: online. Title: Knowledge \"whether\" and belief \"about\" as a lightweight alternative to Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Abstract. Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is the standard logic used to reason about agents\' knowledge and the actions that may affect both their knowledge and the world around them. It is very expressive and general, but this comes at a cost: in particular, DEL planning (that is, determining the existence of a plan given a planning task) is undecidable. In this talk I will be presenting the logic EL-O, a lightweight logic based on observation (or \"knowing whether\"), and how it can be applied to planning. This logic is more expressive than other attempts at simplifying DEL for planning, while retaining the same complexities as classical propositional calculus and classical planning through polynomial translations. I will also be precisely situation EL-O w.r.t. to DEL and arguing that EL-O is not only interesting as a \"weak DEL\", but has a number of advantages over DEL in terms of how intuitive it makes designing models and actions. I will finish by discussing our current attempts to extend this approach to beliefs, going from \"believing that\" to \"having a belief about\" and considering the possible ramifications of epistemic-doxastic situations. Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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LIRa Session: Sophia Knight
by LIRa Seminar 03 Feb '21

03 Feb '21

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ILLC-LIRa February 2021