Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 24 March 16:30.
Please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09
(Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Bonan Zhao (University of Edinburgh)
Date and Time: Thursday, March 24th 2022, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam
time.
Venue: online.
Title: How do people generalize causal relations over objects?
Abstract.
How do people decide how general a causal relationship is, in terms of
the entities or situations it applies to? What features do people use
to decide whether a new situation is governed by a new causal law or
an old one? How can people make these difficult judgments in a fast,
efficient way? We address these questions in two experiments that ask
participants to generalize from one (Experiment 1) or several
(Experiment 2) causal interactions between pairs of objects. In each
case, participants see an agent object act on a recipient object,
causing some changes to the recipient. In line with the human capacity
for few-shot concept learning, we find systematic patterns of causal
generalizations favoring simpler causal laws that extend over
categories of similar objects. In Experiment 1, we find that
participants’ inferences are shaped by the order of the
generalization questions they are asked. In both experiments, we find
an asymmetry in the formation of causal categories: participants
preferentially identify causal laws with features of the agent objects
rather than recipients. To explain this, we develop a computational
model that combines program induction (about the hidden causal laws)
with non-parametric category inference (about their domains of
influence). We demonstrate that our modeling approach can both explain
the order effect in Experiment 1 and the causal asymmetry, and
outperforms a naïve Bayesian account while providing a
computationally plausible mechanism for real-world causal
generalization.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, 24 March 16:30.
Please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09
(Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Bonan Zhao (University of Edinburgh)
Date and Time: Thursday, March 24th 2022, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam
time.
Venue: online.
Title: How do people generalize causal relations over objects?
Abstract.
How do people decide how general a causal relationship is, in terms of
the entities or situations it applies to? What features do people use
to decide whether a new situation is governed by a new causal law or
an old one? How can people make these difficult judgments in a fast,
efficient way? We address these questions in two experiments that ask
participants to generalize from one (Experiment 1) or several
(Experiment 2) causal interactions between pairs of objects. In each
case, participants see an agent object act on a recipient object,
causing some changes to the recipient. In line with the human capacity
for few-shot concept learning, we find systematic patterns of causal
generalizations favoring simpler causal laws that extend over
categories of similar objects. In Experiment 1, we find that
participants’ inferences are shaped by the order of the
generalization questions they are asked. In both experiments, we find
an asymmetry in the formation of causal categories: participants
preferentially identify causal laws with features of the agent objects
rather than recipients. To explain this, we develop a computational
model that combines program induction (about the hidden causal laws)
with non-parametric category inference (about their domains of
influence). We demonstrate that our modeling approach can both explain
the order effect in Experiment 1 and the causal asymmetry, and
outperforms a naïve Bayesian account while providing a
computationally plausible mechanism for real-world causal
generalization.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 17 March 16:30.
Please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09
(Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Hans van Ditmarsch (Open University, Heerlen)
Date and Time: Thursday, March 17th 2022, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam
time.
Venue: online.
Title: Wanted Dead or Alive: Epistemic logic for impure simplicial
complexes
Abstract. We propose a logic of knowledge for impure simplicial
complexes. Impure simplicial complexes represent distributed systems
under uncertainty over which processes are still active (are alive)
and which processes have failed or crashed (are dead). Our work
generalizes the logic of knowledge for pure simplicial complexes,
where all processes are alive, by Goubault et al. Our logical
semantics has a satisfaction relation defined simultaneously with a
definability relation. The latter restricts which formulas are allowed
to have a truth value: dead processes cannot know or be ignorant of
any proposition, and live processes cannot know or be ignorant of
propositions involving processes they know to be dead. The logic
satisfies some but not all axioms and rules of the modal logic S5.
Impure simplicial complexes correspond to Kripke models where each
agent's accessibility relation is an equivalence relation on a subset
of the domain only, and otherwise empty, and where each propositional
variable is known by an agent.
See also https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.03032
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, 17 March 16:30.
Please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09
(Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Hans van Ditmarsch (Open University, Heerlen)
Date and Time: Thursday, March 17th 2022, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam
time.
Venue: online.
Title: Wanted Dead or Alive: Epistemic logic for impure simplicial
complexes
Abstract. We propose a logic of knowledge for impure simplicial
complexes. Impure simplicial complexes represent distributed systems
under uncertainty over which processes are still active (are alive)
and which processes have failed or crashed (are dead). Our work
generalizes the logic of knowledge for pure simplicial complexes,
where all processes are alive, by Goubault et al. Our logical
semantics has a satisfaction relation defined simultaneously with a
definability relation. The latter restricts which formulas are allowed
to have a truth value: dead processes cannot know or be ignorant of
any proposition, and live processes cannot know or be ignorant of
propositions involving processes they know to be dead. The logic
satisfies some but not all axioms and rules of the modal logic S5.
Impure simplicial complexes correspond to Kripke models where each
agent's accessibility relation is an equivalence relation on a subset
of the domain only, and otherwise empty, and where each propositional
variable is known by an agent. We also propose a notion of
bisimulation for impure simplexes and show bisimulation correspondence
on certain finitary simplexes.
See also https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.03032
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 10 March 16:30.
Please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09
(Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Stipe Pandzic (Utrecht University)
Date and Time: Thursday, March 10th 2022, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam
time.
Venue: online.
Title: Default justification logic as a theory of arguments and
epistemic justification.
Abstract. My goal in this talk is to present a logic of structured
defeasible argumentation using the language of justification logic.
One of the key features that is absent in standard justification
logics is the possibility to weigh different epistemic reasons that
might conflict with one another. To amend this, we develop a semantics
for “defeaters”: conflicting reasons forming a basis to doubt the
original conclusion or to believe an opposite statement. Formally,
non-monotonicity of defeasible reasons is introduced through default
rules with justification logic formulas.
Default justification logic is unique for its ability to represent
defeasible arguments as object-level formulas. Sets of such formulas
are then interpreted with an acceptance semantics, in analogy to
Dung’s abstract argumentation framework semantics. In contrast to
argumentation frameworks, determining arguments’ acceptance in
default justification logic simply turns into finding (non-monotonic)
logical consequences from a starting theory with justification
assertions. We can show that a large subclass of Dung’s frameworks
is a special case of default justification logic. By the end of this
talk, I will connect this logic of arguments with the epistemological
debate on justified-true-belief definition of knowledge.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, 10 March 16:30.
Please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09
(Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Stipe Pandzic (Utrecht University)
Date and Time: Thursday, March 10th 2022, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam
time.
Venue: online.
Title: Default justification logic as a theory of arguments and
epistemic justification.
Abstract. My goal in this talk is to present a logic of structured
defeasible argumentation using the language of justification logic.
One of the key features that is absent in standard justification
logics is the possibility to weigh different epistemic reasons that
might conflict with one another. To amend this, we develop a semantics
for “defeaters”: conflicting reasons forming a basis to doubt the
original conclusion or to believe an opposite statement. Formally,
non-monotonicity of defeasible reasons is introduced through default
rules with justification logic formulas.
Default justification logic is unique for its ability to represent
defeasible arguments as object-level formulas. Sets of such formulas
are then interpreted with an acceptance semantics, in analogy to
Dung’s abstract argumentation framework semantics. In contrast to
argumentation frameworks, determining arguments’ acceptance in
default justification logic simply turns into finding (non-monotonic)
logical consequences from a starting theory with justification
assertions. We can show that a large subclass of Dung’s frameworks
is a special case of default justification logic. By the end of this
talk, I will connect this logic of arguments with the epistemological
debate on justified-true-belief definition of knowledge.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 3 March 16:30.
Please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09
(Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Louwe Kuijer (University of Liverpool)
Date and Time: Thursday, March 3rd 2022, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam
time.
Venue: online.
Title: Doing the best I can.
Abstract.
A preference structure is a graph that indicates preferences
between alternatives. These alternatives could be possible worlds,
outcomes of an action, strategies in a game or something else
entirely. The preferences, similarly, can mean many different things:
a world might be preferred over another if it is more plausible, an
outcome if it improves social welfare, and a strategy might be
preferred over another strategy that it defeats.
>From these preferences we can determine the set of "best" worlds,
outcomes and strategies. Generally, one should believe the best
worlds, strive to obtain the best outcomes and play the best
strategies. As usual in deontic logic, we can then define a notion of
obligation (to believe, bring about or play), where ϕ is obligatory,
denoted B(ϕ) if all of the best alternatives satisfy ϕ (and thus it
is impossible to satisfy the obligation to be "best'' without making
ϕ true).
This notion of obligation can be extended to a conditional one,
B(ϕ|ψ), where ϕ is obligatory given ψ, by relativization. In other
words, we restrict the preference structure to those alternatives that
satisfy ψ, and check whether ϕ is true in all of the best
alternatives in that structure.
The properties of this conditional obligation operator depend on (1)
exactly how we define what the "best" states in a preference structure
are and (2) what properties the preference relation satisfies (e.g.,
transitive, total, anti-symmetric).
In this talk, I will discuss characterizations of the conditional
belief operator under various such assumptions. We will also consider
one case where, despite searching for a long time, I did not manage to
find a characterization: this turned out to be because such a
characterization does not exist.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team