ILLC-LIRa March 2024

illc-lira@list.uva.nl

1 participants
7 discussions

LIRa session: Tim French (tomorrow, Wednesday, 27 March 16:30)
by LIRa Seminar 26 Mar '24

26 Mar '24

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Wednesday, 27 March 16:30. To attend online, please use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09 (Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723) You can find the details of the talk below. Speaker: Tim French (The University of Western Australia) Date and Time: Wednesday, March 27th 2024, 16:30-18:00 (PLEASE NOTE the unusual day of the week) Venue: ILLC seminar room F1.15 in Science Park 107 and online. Title: Aleatoric Reasoning: The World as an Urn of Marbles Abstract. Imagine the world, and all that we experience as being capriciously random like an urn of marbles. There is no causality or meaning; just random chance. Will it rain today? We draw a marble from the urn and if it is blue, it will rain. Will it snow today? We draw three marbles from the urn and if they are all blue it will snow. Such a world can be succinctly modelled by a domain of marbles (a probability space), and a set of Boolean predicates defined over the domain of marbles. By providing a language where complex propositions are defined over the set of predicate atoms, correlation emerges and reason may be applied. This is not ontological reason, or scientific causality, but rather the pure epistemic bias that comes from observation. This language provides a simple model of belief and knowledge: an agent's beliefs are given by the probability space of marbles in an urn, conditioned on experience; and an agent's knowledge is communicated a priori, as the form of equivalences among complex propositions, creating correspondences among the world's inherent randomness. In this talk we will discuss and present and language for building complex propositions from these aleatoric atoms, and define a logic of identity among the propositions. We will demonstrate some basic applications of the logic, including some interesting proof theoretic and expressivity results. We will then explore the process of learning in an aleatoric world, using some convenient mathematical results to show how conditioning can be applied when observations correspond to complex aleatoric propositions. This allows agents to refine their beliefs according to experience and knowledge, and gain a meaningful understanding of the aleatoric world. Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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LIRa session: Tim French (Wednesday, 27 March 16:30)
by LIRa Seminar 21 Mar '24

21 Mar '24

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session on Wednesday, 27 March 16:30. PLEASE NOTE the unusual day of the week! This will be a hybrid session. To attend online, please use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09 (Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723) You can find the details of the talk below. Speaker: Tim French (The University of Western Australia) Date and Time: Wednesday, March 27th 2024, 16:30-18:00 Venue: ILLC seminar room F1.15 in Science Park 107 and online. Title: Aleatoric Reasoning: The World as an Urn of Marbles Abstract. Imagine the world, and all that we experience as being capriciously random like an urn of marbles. There is no causality or meaning; just random chance. Will it rain today? We draw a marble from the urn and if it is blue, it will rain. Will it snow today? We draw three marbles from the urn and if they are all blue it will snow. Such a world can be succinctly modelled by a domain of marbles (a probability space), and a set of Boolean predicates defined over the domain of marbles. By providing a language where complex propositions are defined over the set of predicate atoms, correlation emerges and reason may be applied. This is not ontological reason, or scientific causality, but rather the pure epistemic bias that comes from observation. This language provides a simple model of belief and knowledge: an agent's beliefs are given by the probability space of marbles in an urn, conditioned on experience; and an agent's knowledge is communicated a priori, as the form of equivalences among complex propositions, creating correspondences among the world's inherent randomness. In this talk we will discuss and present and language for building complex propositions from these aleatoric atoms, and define a logic of identity among the propositions. We will demonstrate some basic applications of the logic, including some interesting proof theoretic and expressivity results. We will then explore the process of learning in an aleatoric world, using some convenient mathematical results to show how conditioning can be applied when observations correspond to complex aleatoric propositions. This allows agents to refine their beliefs according to experience and knowledge, and gain a meaningful understanding of the aleatoric world. Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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Correction: ONLINE ONLY - LIRa session: Daniel Greco (Today, 21 March 16:30)
by LIRa Seminar 21 Mar '24

21 Mar '24

Dear all, Our previous email was unfortunately contradictory. To clarify: the session today will be ONLINE ONLY, not hybrid. Hence please use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09 (Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723) You can find the details of the talk below. Speaker: Daniel Greco (Yale University) Date and Time: Thursday, March 21st 2024, 16:30-18:00 Venue: Online only Title: Idealization in Epistemology Abstract: I’ll present some material from my recently published book, Idealization in Epistemology: A Modest Modeling Approach. After explaining what I mean by “modest” modeling, and why I take it to provide an attractive framework for thinking about epistemology, I’ll apply that framework to two specific debates. First, I’ll consider the objections to Bayesian models of learning that they go wrong in representing the inputs to learning as certain (strict conditionalization), or, even when not certain, as immune to undermining defeat (Jeffrey conditionalization). I'll argue that these objections should trouble us much less once we’re modest modelers. Second, I’ll consider the argument that it’s computationally infeasible for limited agents like us to make extensive use of probabilities in thought. I’ll argue that this argument targets an implausibly immodest vision of the cognitive role of probabilistic thinking. When aimed at an appropriately modest conception of the role of probabilities in both descriptive and normative decision theory, the argument fails. Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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LIRa session: Daniel Greco (tomorrow, Thursday, 21 March 16:30)
by LIRa Seminar 20 Mar '24

20 Mar '24

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 21 March 16:30. This will be a hybrid session. If you want to attend online, please use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09 (Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723) You can find the details of the talk below. Speaker: Daniel Greco (Yale University) Date and Time: Thursday, March 21st 2024, 16:30-18:00 Venue: Online only Title: Idealization in Epistemology Abstract: I’ll present some material from my recently published book, Idealization in Epistemology: A Modest Modeling Approach. After explaining what I mean by “modest” modeling, and why I take it to provide an attractive framework for thinking about epistemology, I’ll apply that framework to two specific debates. First, I’ll consider the objections to Bayesian models of learning that they go wrong in representing the inputs to learning as certain (strict conditionalization), or, even when not certain, as immune to undermining defeat (Jeffrey conditionalization). I'll argue that these objections should trouble us much less once we’re modest modelers. Second, I’ll consider the argument that it’s computationally infeasible for limited agents like us to make extensive use of probabilities in thought. I’ll argue that this argument targets an implausibly immodest vision of the cognitive role of probabilistic thinking. When aimed at an appropriately modest conception of the role of probabilities in both descriptive and normative decision theory, the argument fails. Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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LIRa session: Daniel Greco (Thursday, 21 March 16:30, online only)
by LIRa Seminar 16 Mar '24

16 Mar '24

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, 21 March 16:30. This will be an online-only session. To attend please use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09 (Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723) You can find the details of the talk below. Speaker: Daniel Greco (Yale University) Date and Time: Thursday, March 21st 2024, 16:30-18:00 Venue: Online only Title: Idealization in Epistemology Abstract: I’ll present some material from my recently published book, Idealization in Epistemology: A Modest Modeling Approach. After explaining what I mean by “modest” modeling, and why I take it to provide an attractive framework for thinking about epistemology, I’ll apply that framework to two specific debates. First, I’ll consider the objections to Bayesian models of learning that they go wrong in representing the inputs to learning as certain (strict conditionalization), or, even when not certain, as immune to undermining defeat (Jeffrey conditionalization). I'll argue that these objections should trouble us much less once we’re modest modelers. Second, I’ll consider the argument that it’s computationally infeasible for limited agents like us to make extensive use of probabilities in thought. I’ll argue that this argument targets an implausibly immodest vision of the cognitive role of probabilistic thinking. When aimed at an appropriately modest conception of the role of probabilities in both descriptive and normative decision theory, the argument fails. Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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LIRa session: Cat Saint-Croix (tomorrow, Thursday, 7 March 16:30, ONLINE only)
by LIRa Seminar 06 Mar '24

06 Mar '24

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 7 March 16:30. This will be an online only session. To attend, please use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09 (Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723) You can find the details of the talk below. Speaker: Cat Saint-Croix (University of Minnesota, Twin Cities) Date and Time: Thursday, March 7th 2024, 16:30-18:00 Venue: Only online. Title: Standpoint Epistemology for Bayesians Abstract. It is often supposed that feminist and formal epistemologies stand in opposition to one another. But, this is not so, at least when it comes to Standpoint Epistemology and Bayesian Epistemology. In fact, these two are particularly compatible. I begin by showing that Bayesian Epistemology is not among the usual “targets” of Standpoint Epistemology. Toole (2022) “Demarginalizing Standpoint Epistemology” characterizes these targets as aperspectival and atomistic, neither of which is true of Bayesian approaches. Furthermore, when we consider the convergence theorems—a traditional argument in favor of Bayesian Epistemology—the need for Standpoint Epistemology becomes clear: Bayesians cannot begin to satisfy the conditions necessary for convergence without taking the observations and recommendations of Standpoint Epistemology into account. Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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LIRa session: Cat Saint-Croix (Thursday, 7 March 16:30, online only)
by LIRa Seminar 01 Mar '24

01 Mar '24

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, 7 March 16:30. This will be an online only session. To attend, please use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09 (Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723) You can find the details of the talk below. Speaker: Cat Saint-Croix (University of Minnesota, Twin Cities) Date and Time: Thursday, March 7th 2024, 16:30-18:00 Venue: Only online. Title: Standpoint Epistemology for Bayesians Abstract. It is often supposed that feminist and formal epistemologies stand in opposition to one another. But, this is not so, at least when it comes to Standpoint Epistemology and Bayesian Epistemology. In fact, these two are particularly compatible. I begin by showing that Bayesian Epistemology is not among the usual “targets” of Standpoint Epistemology. Toole (2022) “Demarginalizing Standpoint Epistemology” characterizes these targets as aperspectival and atomistic, neither of which is true of Bayesian approaches. Furthermore, when we consider the convergence theorems—a traditional argument in favor of Bayesian Epistemology—the need for Standpoint Epistemology becomes clear: Bayesians cannot begin to satisfy the conditions necessary for convergence without taking the observations and recommendations of Standpoint Epistemology into account. Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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ILLC-LIRa March 2024