Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 30 May 16:30.
To attend online, please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09
(Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Adam Bjorndahl (Carnegie Mellon University)
Date and Time: Thursday, 30th May, 2024, 16:30-18:00
Venue: ILLC seminar room F1.15 in Science Park 107 and online.
Title: Belief and Causation
Abstract: We develop a formal framework for reasoning simultaneously
about belief and causation. There is a long and rich history of
mathematical models for these concepts, yet no work we are aware of
that fully integrates the two. The combined model we propose is of
interest from at least two perspectives. First, it allows us to
represent beliefs about causal structure — for example, an agent who
believes (perhaps falsely) that raising interest rates will cause
inflation to cool. Second, it allows us to encode potential causal
relationships involving beliefs — for example, an agent whose belief
that it rained last night is a causal consequence of their lawn being
wet. Notably, we can also capture potential causal relationships
between beliefs — for instance, an agent whose belief in p is a
causal consequence of their belief in q. This framework therefore
allows us to deploy the machinery of causal models to implement a kind
of belief revision, such as an agent who learns q thereby coming to
believe p, where "learns q" in this context takes the form of a
(causal) intervention setting the "variable" Bq to true.
This is joint work(-in-progress) with Joseph Halpern.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, 30 May 16:30.
To attend online, please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09
(Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Adam Bjorndahl (Carnegie Mellon University)
Date and Time: Thursday, 30th May, 2024, 16:30-18:00
Venue: ILLC seminar room F1.15 in Science Park 107 and online.
Title: Belief and Causation
Abstract: We develop a formal framework for reasoning simultaneously
about belief and causation. There is a long and rich history of
mathematical models for these concepts, yet no work we are aware of
that fully integrates the two. The combined model we propose is of
interest from at least two perspectives. First, it allows us to
represent beliefs about causal structure — for example, an agent who
believes (perhaps falsely) that raising interest rates will cause
inflation to cool. Second, it allows us to encode potential causal
relationships involving beliefs — for example, an agent whose belief
that it rained last night is a causal consequence of their lawn being
wet. Notably, we can also capture potential causal relationships
between beliefs — for instance, an agent whose belief in p is a
causal consequence of their belief in q. This framework therefore
allows us to deploy the machinery of causal models to implement a kind
of belief revision, such as an agent who learns q thereby coming to
believe p, where "learns q" in this context takes the form of a
(causal) intervention setting the "variable" Bq to true.
This is joint work(-in-progress) with Joseph Halpern.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 16 May 16:30.
This session will be only online, not on location.
To attend, please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09
(Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Francisca Silva (University of St Andrews)
Date and Time: Thursday, May 16th 2024, 16:30-18:00
Venue: online only
Title: Epistemic Logic with Partial Grasp
Abstract. In this talk I'll argue that we have to gain in recognizing
in our epistemic logics with subject matters a relation between agents
and the parts of subject matters that play a role in agents' cognitive
lives. I call this relation "grasping". I zone in on one notion of
having a partial grasp of a subject matter -- that of agents grasping
part of the subject matter that they are attending to -- and
characterize it. I propose that giving up the idealization that we
fully grasp the subject matters we attend to allows one to more
realistically characterize the epistemic life of agents. To show this,
I propose an epistemic logic with partial grasp that has in mind
considerations from extensions of subject matter theory to the
first-order case with the aim of avoiding certain forms of logical
omniscience, and which provides an alternative to immanent closure
(Yablo, 2014).
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, 16 May 16:30.
To attend online, please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09
(Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Francisca Silva (University of St Andrews)
Date and Time: Thursday, May 16th 2024, 16:30-18:00
Venue: online only
Title and abstract are not available yet - we will provide as soon as possible.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team