Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, 6 March 16:30.
To attend online, please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09
(Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Bartosz Więckowski (Goethe Universität Frankfurt am Main)
Date and Time: Thursday, March 6th 2025, 16:30-18:00
Venue: ILLC Seminar Room F1.15, Science Park 107 and online.
Title: Proof-Theoretic Considerations on the Structure of Reasoning
with Counterfactuals and Knowledge.
Abstract. Combined reasoning with counterfactuals and knowledge/belief
may involve constructions which:
(i) embed knowledge (relativized to an agent a) in the antecedent
(resp. consequent) of a counterfactual (e.g., 'If a knew that A, a
would believe that B'), or
(ii) prefix knowledge to a counterfactual (e.g., 'a knows that if A
were the case, B would be the case'), or
(iii) do both;
where the embedding and prefixing can be iterated. Counterfactual
inference is typically studied from a model-theoretic perspective. In
this talk, we take a proof-theoretic perspective. We combine
components from [1] and [2], so as to obtain intuitionistic subatomic
natural deduction systems for combined reasoning with ('would'- and
'might'-) counterfactuals and knowledge (resp. belief) which are
proof-theoretically well-behaved (normalization,
subexpression/subformula property, internal completeness) and which
admit the formulation of a semantically autarkic proof-theoretic
semantics for elementary combined constructions of the aforementioned
kinds.
[1] Więckowski, B. (2021). Intuitionistic multi-agent subatomic
natural deduction for belief and knowledge, Journal of Logic and
Computation 31(3): 704-770. Special issue on External and Internal
Calculi for Non-Classical Logics edited by A. Ciabattoni, D. Galmiche,
N. Olivetti, and R. Ramanayake.
https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exab013
[2] ---. (2024). Counterfactual assumptions and counterfactual
implications. In Piecha, T. and Wehmeier, K. F., eds., Peter
Schroeder-Heister on Proof-Theoretic Semantics, Outstanding
Contributions to Logic, Vol. 29, pp. 399-423. Cham, Switzerland:
Springer.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50981-0_15
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 27 February 16:30.
To attend online, please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09
(Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Michael Cohen (Tilburg University)
Date and Time: Thursday, February 27th 2025, 16:30-18:00
Venue: ILLC Seminar Room F1.15, Science Park 107 and online.
Title: Imperfect Recall and Monty Hall
Abstract. Philosophical arguments for the rationality of Bayesian
conditioning, such as diachronic Dutch book arguments, often refer to
assumptions and concepts from epistemic logic without fully
explicating them. In this talk, I use dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) to
analyze the underlying logical assumptions of these philosophical
arguments. I show that Perfect Recall is an important epistemic
principle at the heart of the project of justifying Bayesian
conditioning. Following the existing Bayesian literature, I use Monty
Hall style cases to demonstrate the connection between Perfect Recall
and the commitments of Bayesian conditioning. Along the way, we get an
interesting DEL modelling of the Monty Hall puzzle.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, 27 February 16:30.
To attend online, please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09
(Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Michael Cohen (Tilburg University)
Date and Time: Thursday, February 27th 2025, 16:30-18:00
Venue: ILLC Seminar Room F1.15, Science Park 107 and online.
Title: Imperfect Recall and Monty Hall
Abstract. Philosophical arguments for the rationality of Bayesian
conditioning, such as diachronic Dutch book arguments, often refer to
assumptions and concepts from epistemic logic without fully
explicating them. In this talk, I use dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) to
analyze the underlying logical assumptions of these philosophical
arguments. I show that Perfect Recall is an important epistemic
principle at the heart of the project of justifying Bayesian
conditioning. Following the existing Bayesian literature, I use Monty
Hall style cases to demonstrate the connection between Perfect Recall
and the commitments of Bayesian conditioning. Along the way, we get an
interesting DEL modelling of the Monty Hall puzzle.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 20 February 16:30.
To attend, please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09
(Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Gerhard Schurz (Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf)
Date and time: Thursday, February 20th 2025, 16:30-18:00
Venue: online.
Title: Meta-Induction and Its Applications in Social Epistemology
Abstract.
Meta-induction has been developed as a new approach to Hume's problem
of justifying induction. The approach concedes the force of Hume’s
sceptical arguments against the possibility of a non-circular
justification of the reliability of induction. What it demonstrates is
that one can nevertheless give a non-circular justification of the
optimality of induction based on meta-induction. The method of
meta-induction tracks the success records of all accessible methods of
prediction or action (including advice from experts, peers, or
algorithms) and combines them in a success-dependent way, in order to
obtain a superior method that is provably optimal among all
prediction methods accessible to the epistemic agent.
Since meta-induction can be viewed as a form of social learning, it
has important applications in social epistemology. In the second part
of the talk a form of social learning called local meta-induction is
presented. In local meta-induction it is assumed that individuals can
access only the success records of the individuals in their immediate
epistemic neighborhood. It is shown that local meta-inductive learning
can spread reliable information over the entire population, and has
clear advantages compared to success-independent social learning
methods such as peer-imitation and authority-imitation.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, 20 February 16:30.
To attend online, please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09
(Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Gerhard Schurz (Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf)
Date and time: Thursday, February 20th 2025, 16:30-18:00
Venue: online.
Title: Meta-Induction and Its Applications in Social Epistemology
Abstract.
Meta-induction has been developed as a new approach to Hume's problem
of justifying induction. The approach concedes the force of Hume’s
sceptical arguments against the possibility of a non-circular
justification of the reliability of induction. What it demonstrates is
that one can nevertheless give a non-circular justification of the
optimality of induction based on meta-induction. The method of
meta-induction tracks the success records of all accessible methods of
prediction or action (including advice from experts, peers, or
algorithms) and combines them in a success-dependent way, in order to
obtain a superior method that is provably optimal among all
prediction methods accessible to the epistemic agent.
Since meta-induction can be viewed as a form of social learning, it
has important applications in social epistemology. In the second part
of the talk a form of social learning called local meta-induction is
presented. In local meta-induction it is assumed that individuals can
access only the success records of the individuals in their immediate
epistemic neighborhood. It is shown that local meta-inductive learning
can spread reliable information over the entire population, and has
clear advantages compared to success-independent social learning
methods such as peer-imitation and authority-imitation.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 13 February 16:30.
To attend online, please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09
(Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Maria Aloni (ILLC, University of Amsterdam)
Date and Time: Thursday, February 13th 2025, 16:30-18:00
Venue: ILLC Seminar Room F1.15, Science Park 107 and online.
Title: Nothing is logical.
Abstract. People reason in ways which often deviate from classical
logic. An influential idea introduced by Grice is that these
deviations are not logical mistakes but rather consequences of
pragmatic enrichments: the fact that language users often interpret
linguistic expressions as conveying more than what is literally said
(Grice 1989). In the Gricean tradition, pragmatic enrichments (also
known as implicatures) are derived as the product of rational
interactions between cooperative language users. In this project we
explore a different explanation for some of the non-classical
inferences people draw in conversation: they are not the result of
Gricean reasonings but rather a consequence of a tendency in human
cognition to avoid empty representations (neglect-zero bias). In the
talk I will first introduce a team-based modal logic which models the
neglect-zero tendency and makes predictions on its impact on reasoning
and interpretation; and then present the results of some experiments
we conducted to test these predictions.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, 13 February 16:30.
To attend online, please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09
(Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Maria Aloni (ILLC, University of Amsterdam)
Date and Time: Thursday, February 13th 2025, 16:30-18:00
Venue: ILLC Seminar Room F1.15, Science Park 107 and online.
Title: Nothing is logical.
Abstract. People reason in ways which often deviate from classical
logic. An influential idea introduced by Grice is that these
deviations are not logical mistakes but rather consequences of
pragmatic enrichments: the fact that language users often interpret
linguistic expressions as conveying more than what is literally said
(Grice 1989). In the Gricean tradition, pragmatic enrichments (also
known as implicatures) are derived as the product of rational
interactions between cooperative language users. In this project we
explore a different explanation for some of the non-classical
inferences people draw in conversation: they are not the result of
Gricean reasonings but rather a consequence of a tendency in human
cognition to avoid empty representations (neglect-zero bias). In the
talk I will first introduce a team-based modal logic which models the
neglect-zero tendency and makes predictions on its impact on reasoning
and interpretation; and then present the results of some experiments
we conducted to test these predictions.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will start the new year with a Joint CLS-DIP-Nihil-LIRa session on Thursday, 6 February 16:30.
To attend online, please use this (different than usual!) zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/86741669758?pwd=vbWKzB6DbCZJEwqHg014qF5PlEGSWw.1
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Raffaella Bernardi (University of Trento)
Date and Time: Thursday, February 6th 2025, 16:30-18:00
Venue: room L0.06 in Lab 42, Science Park Amsterdam and online
(note: different zoom link than usual, see above)
Title: The interplay between language and reasoning.
Abstract. Large Language Models, and ChatGPT in particular, have
recently grabbed the attention of the community and the media. Having
reached high language proficiency, attention has been shifting toward
its reasoning capabilities. It has been shown that ChatGPT can carry
out some simple deductive reasoning steps when provided with a series
of facts out of which it is tasked to draw some inferences. In this
talk, I will argue for the need for models whose language generation
is driven by an implicit reasoning process and a communication goal.
To support my claim, I will present two papers recently produced
within my group: one evaluates LLMs' formal reasoning skills and the
other focuses on LLMs’ information-seeking strategies; to this end,
we take syllogisms and the 20-Questions game as test beds. These tasks
have been used extensively in cognitive sciences to study human
reasoning skills, hence they provide us with a variety of experiments
to inspect the language and reasoning interplay in LLMs.
Leonardo Bertolazzi, Albert Gatt, Raffaella Bernardi: A Systematic
Analysis of Large Language Models as Soft Reasoners: The Case of
Syllogistic Inferences, EMNLP 2024
https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.11341
Davide Mazzaccara, Alberto Testoni, Raffaella Bernardi: Learning to
Ask Informative Questions: Enhancing LLMs with Preference Optimization
and Expected Information Gain, EMNLP 2024
https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.17453
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team