ILLC-LIRa March 2025

illc-lira@list.uva.nl

1 participants
2 discussions

LIRa session: Timo Eckhardt and David J. Pym (Thursday, 13 March 16:30, online only)
by LIRa Seminar 08 Mar '25

08 Mar '25

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, 13 March 16:30. To attend, please use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09 (Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723) You can find the details of the talk below. Speaker: Timo Eckhardt (University College London) and David J. Pym (University College London & Institute of Philosophy, University of London) Date and Time: Thursday, March 13th 2025, 16:30-18:00 Venue: online. Title: Inferentialist Public Announcement Logics Abstract. TBA.Beginning with an introduction to proof-theoretic semantics, which may be seen as a logical realization of inferentialism, we present a base-extension semantics (B-eS) for public announcement logics (PAL) as a first step in developing B-eS for the larger group of dynamic epistemic logics. This is used to discuss some examples of PAL (including the famous Muddy Children Puzzle) in order to highlight some insights that an inferential perspective can give on the role of information in the reasoning employed. Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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LIRa session: Bartosz Więckowski (tomorrow, Thursday, 6 March 16:30)
by LIRa Seminar 05 Mar '25

05 Mar '25

Dear all, We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 6 March 16:30. To attend online, please use our recurring zoom link: https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/89230639823?pwd=YWJuSnJmTDhXcWhmd1ZkeG5zb0o5UT09 (Meeting ID: 892 3063 9823, Passcode: 421723) You can find the details of the talk below. Speaker: Bartosz Więckowski (Goethe Universität Frankfurt am Main) Date and Time: Thursday, March 6th 2025, 16:30-18:00 Venue: ILLC Seminar Room F1.15, Science Park 107 and online. Title: Proof-Theoretic Considerations on the Structure of Reasoning with Counterfactuals and Knowledge. Abstract. Combined reasoning with counterfactuals and knowledge/belief may involve constructions which: (i) embed knowledge (relativized to an agent a) in the antecedent (resp. consequent) of a counterfactual (e.g., 'If a knew that A, a would believe that B'), or (ii) prefix knowledge to a counterfactual (e.g., 'a knows that if A were the case, B would be the case'), or (iii) do both; where the embedding and prefixing can be iterated. Counterfactual inference is typically studied from a model-theoretic perspective. In this talk, we take a proof-theoretic perspective. We combine components from [1] and [2], so as to obtain intuitionistic subatomic natural deduction systems for combined reasoning with ('would'- and 'might'-) counterfactuals and knowledge (resp. belief) which are proof-theoretically well-behaved (normalization, subexpression/subformula property, internal completeness) and which admit the formulation of a semantically autarkic proof-theoretic semantics for elementary combined constructions of the aforementioned kinds. [1] Więckowski, B. (2021). Intuitionistic multi-agent subatomic natural deduction for belief and knowledge, Journal of Logic and Computation 31(3): 704-770. Special issue on External and Internal Calculi for Non-Classical Logics edited by A. Ciabattoni, D. Galmiche, N. Olivetti, and R. Ramanayake. https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exab013 [2] ---. (2024). Counterfactual assumptions and counterfactual implications. In Piecha, T. and Wehmeier, K. F., eds., Peter Schroeder-Heister on Proof-Theoretic Semantics, Outstanding Contributions to Logic, Vol. 29, pp. 399-423. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50981-0_15 Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

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ILLC-LIRa March 2025