Dear all,
This Friday at 16:00, Mehmet Ismail from King's College London will
visit us and give a talk at the COMSOC Seminar. You can find an abstract
below. I hope to see you at the seminar.
As always, for more information on the COMSOC Seminar please consult
http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/seminar/.
All the best,
Ulle
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Speaker: Mehmet Ismail (London)
Title: One for all, all for one—von Neumann, Wald, Rawls, and Pareto
Date: Friday 6 December 2019
Time: 16:00
Location: Room F0.25, Science Park 107, Amsterdam
Abstract: Applications of the maximin criterion extend beyond economics
to statistics, computer science, politics, and operations research.
However, the maximin criterion—be it von Neumann's, Wald's, or
Rawls'—draws fierce criticism due to its extremely pessimistic stance. I
propose a novel concept, dubbed the optimin criterion, which is based on
(Pareto) optimizing the worst-case payoffs of tacit agreements. The
optimin criterion generalizes and unifies results in various fields: It
not only coincides with (i) Wald's statistical decision-making criterion
when Nature is antagonistic, but also generalizes (ii) Nash equilibrium
in n-person constant-sum games, (iii) the core in cooperative games,
(iv) stable matchings in matching models, and (v) competitive
equilibrium in the Arrow-Debreu economy. Moreover, every Nash
equilibrium satisfies the optimin criterion in an auxiliary game.
Finally, the optimin criterion is the first parameter-free concept that
can selectively explain the puzzle of cooperation in games, including
the repeated prisoner's dilemma, the traveler's dilemma, the centipede
game, and the repeated public goods game.
--
Ulle Endriss
ILLC, University of Amsterdam
http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/
