The fourth LogiCIC workshop on Reasoning in Social Context will take
place in Amsterdam on November 26-28, 2015.
https://logicicworkshop2015.wordpress.com/welcome/
About The Workshop:
Via this workshop, we are creating a forum to exchange ideas and explore
new territory in which it is clear that logic can make a difference. We
are particularly interested in the interplay between logic and the
social sciences, i.e. both in studying complex social-epistemic
scenarios as well as in the logical tools and techniques that can be
used to model them. We approach the theme of this workshop from an
interdisciplinary angle, and welcome any insights on to the topic coming
from areas such as Logic, Game Theory, Belief Revision Theory, Formal
Epistemology, Social Science, Cognitive Science and AI (multi-agent
systems).
The focus of this workshop includes (but is not restricted to) the
following topics:
- formal representations of higher-order belief and knowledge – belief
revision strategies and knowledge update rules
- epistemic and doxastic influence
- information flow in social networks
- rational interaction
- epistemic planning
The List of Speakers Includes:
Baltag, Alexandru (University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands);
Bolander, Thomas (Technical University of Denmark, Copenhagen, Denmark);
Seligman, Jeremy (University of Auckland, New Zealand);
Smets, Sonja (University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands);
Zollman, Kevin (Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA);
Eijck, Jan van (CWI, The Netherlands);
Rafiee Rad, Soroush (University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands);
Kelly, Kevin T. (Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA);
Grossi, Davide (University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK);
Pigozzi, Gabriella (Université Paris-Dauphine, Paris, France);
Perović, Slobodan (University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia).
Call For Papers:
Participants who are interested in presenting their work at the workshop
are welcome to submit a 2-page abstract by 7 November 2015 (Central
European Time). Submitted abstracts have to be uploaded on the following
easychair site:
https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=logicic15.
Notifications of acceptance will be sent out by 11 November 2015.
Local Organizers:
Smets, Sonja (The Institute for Logic, Language and Computation,
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands)
And the LogiCIC team members Zoé Christoff, Paolo Galeazzi and Soroush
Rafiee Rad (UvA, The Netherlands)
Organizational Assistance:
Rossel, Pam (The Institute for Logic, Language and Computation,
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands)
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This workshop is the fourth event in the series of LogiCIC workshops in
Amsterdam: https://logicicworkshop2015.wordpress.com/welcome/
The workshop is sponsored by the LogiCIC project (ERC-2011-STG No.
283963), on 'The Logical Structure of Correlated Information Change'
funded by the European Research Council and the European Community under
FP7.
****
Dear all,
next Thursday we will have a LIRa session with Yibin Dai.
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Date: Thursday, 8th of October 2015
Time: 15:30 - 17:30
Venue: ILLC Seminar room F1.15, Science Park 107, Amsterdam
Speaker: Yibin Dai
Title: Truth and truth practices: An investigation of Davidson’s theory
of truth.
Abstract. As for the concept of truth, although Davidson’s ideas don’t
remain stable, his two main points of view keep same: first, that the
concept of truth is undefinable; second, that truth is substantial,
which, according to Davidson, means that truth is closely related to
other concepts, such as meaning, belief and so on. The first point
concerns the concept of truth itself; while the second one deals with
the functions that the concept of truth has, which we call as “truth
practices”. From these two different perspectives, I find that there is
a tension between Davidson’s attitudes towards truth and truth practices
and his specific ways of explaining truth practices. At one point, he
thinks that truth is transcendental and translinguistic and that truth
practices are empirical; at the other point, he uses his specific
explanations of truth practices, such as his truth-conditional theory of
meaning, to criticize other concrete explanations of truth practices,
such as the use theory of meaning. However, truth practices are
empirical, which means that our understandings of truth practices are
not necessary to be the same. That is to say, it is possible that we
have different ways to explain truth practices.
===
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
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More information on the LIRa seminar:
https://www.illc.uva.nl/lgc/seminar
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