Dear all,
Next week we are going to have two sessions of the Computational Social
Choice Seminar at the ILLC. On Monday at 15:30 Simon will deliver an
introductory tutorial on participatory budgeting. On Tuesday at 15:30
Zoi will talk about her recent work on the manipulation of positional
scoring rules when voters report incomplete preferences.
I'm including both abstracts below.
As always, for more information on the COMSOC Seminar please consult
http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/seminar/.
All the best,
Ulle
PS: Apologies for having forgotten to announce Jan Maly's talk to this
mailing list. Jan will still be at the ILLC until the end of next week.
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Speaker: Simon Rey (ILLC)
Title: A Review of the Computational Social Choice Literature on
Participatory Budgeting
Date and time: Monday 25 November 2019, 15:30
Location: F1.15, Science Park 107, Amsterdam
Abstract: Participatory Budgeting is a growing topic in social choice.
Introduced in the late 1980s in Brazil, it is now viewed as a critical
topic to improve the democratic process. In this talk I will introduce
the concept of Participatory Budgeting and give an overview of the
related literature in the field of Computational Social Choice.
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Speaker: Zoi Terzopoulou (ILLC)
Title: Strategic Manipulation with Incomplete Preferences
Date and time: Tuesday 26 November 2019, 15:30
Location: F3.20, Science Park 107, Amsterdam
Abstract: Many websites that recommend various services use
crowdsourcing to collect reviews and rankings. These rankings, usually
concerning a subset of all the offered alternatives, are then
aggregated. Motivated by and generalising upon such scenarios, we
axiomatise a family of positional scoring rules for profiles of possibly
incomplete individual preferences. But many opportunities arise for the
agents to manipulate the outcome in this setting. They may lie in order
to obtain a better result by: (i) switching the order of a ranked pair
of alternatives, (ii) omitting some of their truthful preferences, or
(iii) reporting more preferences than the ones they truthfully hold.
After formalising these new concepts, we characterise all positional
scoring rules that are immune to manipulation. This talk is based on is
joint work with Justin Kruger.
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--
Ulle Endriss
ILLC, University of Amsterdam
http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/
Dear all,
The next talk in the Computational Social Choice Seminar at the ILLC
will be given on Tuesday by Simon Rey, who started his PhD at the ILLC a
few weeks ago. Simon will be speaking about fair division in the
presence of both goods and bads. Hope to see you there!
As always, for more information on the COMSOC Seminar please consult
http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/seminar/.
All the best,
Ulle
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Speaker: Simon Rey (ILLC)
Title: Almost Group Envy-free Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Chores
Date and time: Tuesday 5 November 2019, 16:00
Location: F3.20, Science Park 107, Amsterdam
Abstract: In this talk I will present some recent work I have been doing
with Haris Aziz. We consider a multiagent resource allocation setting in
which an agent's utility may decrease or increase when an item is
allocated. We present stronger and relaxed versions of the group
envy-freeness concept that are especially suitable for the allocation of
indivisible items. Of particular interest is a concept called group
envy-freeness up to one item (GEF1). We study which fairness concepts
guarantee the existence of a fair allocation under which preference
domain. For two natural classes of additive utilities, we design
polynomial-time algorithms to compute a GEF1 allocation.
--
Ulle Endriss
ILLC, University of Amsterdam
http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/
