- comsoc-seminar - list.uva.nl

Restarting the seminar with Oliviero Nardi this Friday
by Ulle Endriss 28 Sep '21

28 Sep '21

Dear all, You are receiving this email because you have signed up to the mailing list for announcements regarding the local COMSOC Seminar at the ILLC. I'm happy to be able to report that we have decided to cautiously restart the seminar. Our first speaker is Oliviero Nardi, who this Friday will talk about the work he did for his MSc AI thesis on a graph-based algorithm for the automated justification of collective decisions. You will find all details on the seminar website: https://staff.science.uva.nl/u.endriss/seminar/ I noticed that several people signed up during the pandemic, also people from outside Amsterdam (and outside the Netherlands). That's of course fine, but in case you signed up by accident and actually were looking for the (online, international) COMSOC Video Seminar, let me know whether you want me to switch you to the other mailing list instead. All the best, Ulle -- Ulle Endriss ILLC, University of Amsterdam http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/

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Aditya Aradhye on Thursday at 15:00
by Ulle Endriss 17 Feb '20

17 Feb '20

Dear all, I'm delighted to announce the next COMSOC Seminar. This Thursday at 15:00 we'll have Aditya Aradhye from Maastricht University talk about his work on group-strategyproof aggregation rules in multidimensional domains. I'm including the abstract below and am looking forward to seeing you here on Thursday. As always, for more information on the COMSOC Seminar please consult http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/seminar/. All the best, Ulle ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Speaker: Aditya Aradhye (Maastricht) Title: Group Strategy-Proof Rules in Multidimensional Domains Date: Thursday 20 February 2020 Time: 15:00 Location: ILLC Seminar Room F1.15, Science Park 107, Amsterdam Abstract: We consider a social choice setting in which the alternatives are binary vectors and the preferences of the agents are determined by the Hamming distance from their most preferred alternative. We restrict the set of social choice functions to 'rules' which satisfy unanimity, anonymity and neutrality. As the preference domain is not the universal domain, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem does not hold. Hence, we study a stronger notion: group strategy-proof rules. We show an impossibility for strongly group strategy-proof rules. -- Ulle Endriss ILLC, University of Amsterdam http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/

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Ulle Endriss on Thursday at 15:30
by Ulle Endriss 20 Jan '20

20 Jan '20

Dear all, The next COMSOC Seminar will take place this Thursday at 15:30, and the speaker on this occasion is yours truly. I'm including the abstract at the end of this message and hope to see you on Thursday. As always, for more information on the COMSOC Seminar please consult http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/seminar/. All the best, Ulle ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Speaker: Ulle Endriss (ILLC) Title: Analysis of Matching Mechanisms via SAT Solving Date and time: Thurday 23 January 2020, 15:30 Location: F1.15, Science Park 107, Amsterdam Abstract: Matching is a research area at the intersection of game theory and social choice theory that is concerned with the design of mechanisms for pairing up agents belonging to two different groups, such as job seekers and companies. In this talk I will explain how to use ideas from mathematical logic (model theory) and computational logic (SAT solving) to obtain impossibility theorems regarding the design of matching mechanisms that satisfy certain intuitively appealing properties (e.g., regarding the stability and fairness of outcomes). -- Ulle Endriss ILLC, University of Amsterdam http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/

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Bernhard von Stengel on Thursday at 16:00
by Ulle Endriss 10 Jan '20

10 Jan '20

Dear all, Happy new year! The first COMSOC Seminar of the year will be given by Bernhard von Stengel from the LSE, next week on Thursday at 16:00. Bernhard will talk about "Game Theory and Politics". This is a first version of a talk he is developing for a general-interest audience, so should be fun and easily accessible to everyone (expect lots of Brexit puns and the like). I'm including the abstract below and hope to see you next week. As always, for more information on the COMSOC Seminar please consult http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/seminar/. All the best, Ulle ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Speaker: Bernhard von Stengel (London) Title: Game Theory and Politics Date and time: Thursday 16 January 2020, 16:00 Location: F1.15, Science Park 107, Amsterdam Abstract: Game theory is the 'science of interaction'. This talk will explain some insights of game theory and apply them to current politics. Of course politicians play games. They offer cheap promises that they think they don't have to fulfil. Such as a "simple" in-out referendum on EU membership in Britain. That game plan went wrong. Game theory may have helped, with tools for thinking ahead and concepts of strategy, to counter the wishful thinking that seems to drive such decisions. Game theory can also help explain the incentive problems of climate change and reasons for democratic deadlock. A game-theoretic analysis shows the importance of the rules of the game, for example in electoral systems. The aim of the talk is to highlight some uses and mis-uses of game theory and decision theory with examples from politics, for a general audience. -- Ulle Endriss ILLC, University of Amsterdam http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/

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Mehmet Ismail on Friday at 16:00
by Ulle Endriss 02 Dec '19

02 Dec '19

Dear all, This Friday at 16:00, Mehmet Ismail from King's College London will visit us and give a talk at the COMSOC Seminar. You can find an abstract below. I hope to see you at the seminar. As always, for more information on the COMSOC Seminar please consult http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/seminar/. All the best, Ulle ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Speaker: Mehmet Ismail (London) Title: One for all, all for one—von Neumann, Wald, Rawls, and Pareto Date: Friday 6 December 2019 Time: 16:00 Location: Room F0.25, Science Park 107, Amsterdam Abstract: Applications of the maximin criterion extend beyond economics to statistics, computer science, politics, and operations research. However, the maximin criterion—be it von Neumann's, Wald's, or Rawls'—draws fierce criticism due to its extremely pessimistic stance. I propose a novel concept, dubbed the optimin criterion, which is based on (Pareto) optimizing the worst-case payoffs of tacit agreements. The optimin criterion generalizes and unifies results in various fields: It not only coincides with (i) Wald's statistical decision-making criterion when Nature is antagonistic, but also generalizes (ii) Nash equilibrium in n-person constant-sum games, (iii) the core in cooperative games, (iv) stable matchings in matching models, and (v) competitive equilibrium in the Arrow-Debreu economy. Moreover, every Nash equilibrium satisfies the optimin criterion in an auxiliary game. Finally, the optimin criterion is the first parameter-free concept that can selectively explain the puzzle of cooperation in games, including the repeated prisoner's dilemma, the traveler's dilemma, the centipede game, and the repeated public goods game. -- Ulle Endriss ILLC, University of Amsterdam http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/

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[COMOSC Seminar] Two seminars next week
by Ulle Endriss 22 Nov '19

22 Nov '19

Dear all, Next week we are going to have two sessions of the Computational Social Choice Seminar at the ILLC. On Monday at 15:30 Simon will deliver an introductory tutorial on participatory budgeting. On Tuesday at 15:30 Zoi will talk about her recent work on the manipulation of positional scoring rules when voters report incomplete preferences. I'm including both abstracts below. As always, for more information on the COMSOC Seminar please consult http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/seminar/. All the best, Ulle PS: Apologies for having forgotten to announce Jan Maly's talk to this mailing list. Jan will still be at the ILLC until the end of next week. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Speaker: Simon Rey (ILLC) Title: A Review of the Computational Social Choice Literature on Participatory Budgeting Date and time: Monday 25 November 2019, 15:30 Location: F1.15, Science Park 107, Amsterdam Abstract: Participatory Budgeting is a growing topic in social choice. Introduced in the late 1980s in Brazil, it is now viewed as a critical topic to improve the democratic process. In this talk I will introduce the concept of Participatory Budgeting and give an overview of the related literature in the field of Computational Social Choice. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Speaker: Zoi Terzopoulou (ILLC) Title: Strategic Manipulation with Incomplete Preferences Date and time: Tuesday 26 November 2019, 15:30 Location: F3.20, Science Park 107, Amsterdam Abstract: Many websites that recommend various services use crowdsourcing to collect reviews and rankings. These rankings, usually concerning a subset of all the offered alternatives, are then aggregated. Motivated by and generalising upon such scenarios, we axiomatise a family of positional scoring rules for profiles of possibly incomplete individual preferences. But many opportunities arise for the agents to manipulate the outcome in this setting. They may lie in order to obtain a better result by: (i) switching the order of a ranked pair of alternatives, (ii) omitting some of their truthful preferences, or (iii) reporting more preferences than the ones they truthfully hold. After formalising these new concepts, we characterise all positional scoring rules that are immune to manipulation. This talk is based on is joint work with Justin Kruger. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- Ulle Endriss ILLC, University of Amsterdam http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/

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[COMOSC Seminar] Simon Rey on Tuesday at 16:00
by Ulle Endriss 02 Nov '19

02 Nov '19

Dear all, The next talk in the Computational Social Choice Seminar at the ILLC will be given on Tuesday by Simon Rey, who started his PhD at the ILLC a few weeks ago. Simon will be speaking about fair division in the presence of both goods and bads. Hope to see you there! As always, for more information on the COMSOC Seminar please consult http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/seminar/. All the best, Ulle ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Speaker: Simon Rey (ILLC) Title: Almost Group Envy-free Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Chores Date and time: Tuesday 5 November 2019, 16:00 Location: F3.20, Science Park 107, Amsterdam Abstract: In this talk I will present some recent work I have been doing with Haris Aziz. We consider a multiagent resource allocation setting in which an agent's utility may decrease or increase when an item is allocated. We present stronger and relaxed versions of the group envy-freeness concept that are especially suitable for the allocation of indivisible items. Of particular interest is a concept called group envy-freeness up to one item (GEF1). We study which fairness concepts guarantee the existence of a fair allocation under which preference domain. For two natural classes of additive utilities, we design polynomial-time algorithms to compute a GEF1 allocation. -- Ulle Endriss ILLC, University of Amsterdam http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/

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[COMOSC Seminar] Aidan Lyon on Friday at 16:00
by Ulle Endriss 09 Sep '19

09 Sep '19

Dear all, I hope you had an enjoyable summer. The Computational Social Choice Seminar at the ILLC is back in session now. We'll start with a talk by Aidan Lyon this Friday at 16:00. Aidan is CEO and co-founder of DelphiCloud, a start-up here at the Science Park. See abstract below. I hope to see you this Friday! As always, for more information on the COMSOC Seminar please consult http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/seminar/. All the best, Ulle ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Speaker: Aidan Lyon (DelphiCloud) Title: DelphiCloud: Eliciting and Aggregating Expert Estimates Date: Friday 13 September 2019 Time: 16:00 Location: Room F1.15, Science Park 107, Amsterdam Abstract: In this talk I give a brief overview of the business and research work of DelphiCloud, a company created by philosophers for the purpose of bringing philosophical and psychological research to the private sector. I'll then present in detail some of the work we are doing with the repliCATS team at the University of Melbourne as part of the DARPA SCORE project. The SCORE project is an attempt to address the reproducibility crisis in the social sciences in part by getting experts to estimate the reproducibility of thousands of studies in these fields. -- Ulle Endriss ILLC, University of Amsterdam http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/

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[COMOSC Seminar] Lefteris Kirousis on Monday at 15:00
by Ulle Endriss 26 Jun '19

26 Jun '19

Dear all, The next Computational Social Choice Seminar at the ILLC will take place on Monday at 15:00. It will be delivered by Lefteris Kirousis (Athens), who is going to be visiting for the day. He will speak about possibility results in judgment aggregation. I'm including the abstract below. As always, for more information on the COMSOC Seminar please consult http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/seminar/. All the best, Ulle ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Speaker: Lefteris Kirousis (Athens) Title: Abstract Possibility Domains: Algorithms and Characterizations Date: Monday 1 July 2019 Time: 15:00 Location: ILLC Room F1.15, Science Park 107, Amsterdam Abstract Let V be a set of possible evaluations on an issue, with cardinality two or possibly greater. An abstract domain (or just domain) is an arbitrary subset D of a Cartesian power V^m. The elements of a domain are considered to represent the rational, or permissible, evaluation vectors on m issues, in some abstract sense of rationality. Given an integer k>1, a k-ary aggregator for D is a function F defined for all elements of D^k and taking values in D. We assume that aggregators are defined independently on each issue and that they are supportive. An aggregator F is called non-dictatorial if it differs from all projection functions on any d in 1..k. A domain D is called a possibility domain if it admits a non-dictatorial aggregator of some arity k. I will first give necessary and sufficient conditions for D to be a possibility domain in terms of existence of binary or ternary aggregators. Using this characterization as a stepping stone, I will give efficient (polynomial time in the size of the domain) algorithms that decide whether an input domain is a possibility one. Finally in the case the cardinality of V is exactly two (Boolean case), I will define a class of Conjunctive Normal Form formulas of Propositional Logic that describe the domains that are possibility ones. I will also prove that such formulas are recognizable in linear time in the size of the input formula. -- Ulle Endriss ILLC, University of Amsterdam http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/

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[COMOSC Seminar] Talk by Frank Feys cancelled
by Ulle Endriss 24 Jun '19

24 Jun '19

Dear all, Unfortunately, we had to cancel the talk by Frank Feys in the COMSOC Seminar at the ILLC planned for this Tuesday, because Frank got sick. I hope that we will be able to reschedule his talk sometime soon. http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/seminar/ All the best, Ulle -- Ulle Endriss ILLC, University of Amsterdam http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/

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