Dear all,
The next talk in the Computational Social Choice Seminar at the ILLC is scheduled for this Friday already. Emel Öztürk from the UvA's Faculty of Economics and Business will present her work on the axiomatic analysis of the problem of finding a fair and stable allocation of water extracted from a river to a group of stake-holders with different entitlements. The talk will start at 16:00. I'm including the abstract below.
As always, for more information on the COMSOC Seminar, please consult https://staff.science.uva.nl/u.endriss/seminar/.
All the best, Ulle
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Speaker: Z. Emel Öztürk (UvA) Title: An Efficient, Fair and Stable Solution to the River Sharing Problem Date: Friday 22 March 2019 Time: 16:00 Location: Room F1.15, Science Park 107, Amsterdam Abstract
A group of agents is ordered along a linear river. Each agent has quasilinear preferences over water and money. A vector of property rights, referred to as the reference vector, specifies how much water each agent is entitled to. The key concept in this study is an allocation's distance-to-reference vector. At an allocation, this vector specifies, for each agent, the amount of money that needs to be subtracted from the bundle the agent receives in order for the agent to be indifferent between the reference vector and the allocation. First, we characterize a social ordering, called the reference-welfare equivalent Lorenz ordering, which prefers an allocation to another if the distance-to-reference vector of the former is more equal than the distance-to-reference vector of the latter. Second, we show that maximizing the reference-welfare equivalent Lorenz ordering over the set of acceptable allocations (defined in the sense of the core) leads to a unique allocation which meets the three key objectives of international river management: efficiency, fairness and stability. Moreover, we show that this allocation coincides with the egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (Econometrica, 1989) and the downstream incremental solution of Ambec and Sprumont (Journal of Economic Theory, 2002) for particular conceptions of property rights.