ILLC-LIRa

illc-lira@list.uva.nl

1 participants
594 discussions

Applied Logic Seminar at TU Delft: Marcus Pivato: Categorical Decision Theory (Tuesday, 27 October)
by LIRa Team 25 Oct '15

25 Oct '15

Dear All, we forward an invitation to the Applied Logic Seminar at TU Delft, see below for all details and contact Giuseppe Greco G.Greco(a)tudelft.nl if you have any further questions. The LIRa team ------------------------ Dear All, We would like to invite you to the Applied Logic Seminar at TU Delft (http://www.appliedlogictudelft.nl/applied-logic-seminar/). The purpose of these meetings is to disseminate and discuss ideas and results about logic, with a special focus on applications and interactions with natural and social sciences. When: Tuesday, 27 October, 2015 2.00pm - 4.00pm Where: room b1.300, building 31, Jaffalaan 5 Technische Universiteit Delft, 2628 BX Delft Speaker: Marcus Pivato (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, France) Title: Categorical Decision Theory Abstract (Joint work with Vassili Vergopoulos of the Paris School of Economics) Individuals and societies must often make difficult decisions, which are fraught with uncertainty. How should an agent decide when faced with such uncertainty? This is the subject of a branch of theoretical economics called Decision Theory. Bernoulli (1738) claimed that we should choose the alternative which yields the highest expected utility. But what justifies this methodology? Savage (1954) showed that, if our decision-making process satisfies certain axioms (encoding basic properties of "consistency" and "rationality"), then it must maximize expected utility. Savage's Theorem is considered the foundational result of modern Decision Theory. Savage posited a set S of possible "states of nature" and a set X of possible "outcomes". He supposed that each alternative defined a function (an "act") mapping states to outcomes. His theorem constructs a probability measure on S and a utility function on X. However, this approach raises at least three issues. 1. Savage assumed that S and X were arbitrary sets, and acts were arbitrary functions. But what if S and X are topological spaces, and acts must be continuous? What if S and Xare differentiable manifolds, and acts must be differentiable? We would like a single theory which works in all of these environments (and others). 2. In many applications, it is unrealistic to suppose that we can enumerate all possible states of nature or all possible outcomes "in advance". Thus, there is growing interest in developing decision theory without an explicit specification of S or X. 3. At different times, the same agent might be faced with many different sources of uncertainty (i.e. different instances of S) and many different menus of outcomes (different instances of X), in different combinations. We would like a single holistic description of the agent's decisions over all of these possible decision problems. In this talk, we will reformulate decision theory using the tools of category theory, and derive a version of Savage's theorem which addresses all three of these issues. Please do not hesitate to forward this message to anyone else who might be interested. Best wishes, Alessandra, Giuseppe, Sabine and Fan. ------------------------

1 0

Tomorrow: LIRa session with Yibin Dai.
by Malvin Gattinger 07 Oct '15

07 Oct '15

Dear all, tomorrow we will have a LIRa session with Yibin Dai. PLEASE NOTE: We will start at 16:00 pm. === Date: Thursday, 8th of October 2015 Time: 16:00 - 17:30 Venue: ILLC Seminar room F1.15, Science Park 107, Amsterdam Speaker: Yibin Dai Title: Truth and truth practices: An investigation of Davidson’s theory of truth. Abstract. As for the concept of truth, although Davidson’s ideas don’t remain stable, his two main points of view keep same: first, that the concept of truth is undefinable; second, that truth is substantial, which, according to Davidson, means that truth is closely related to other concepts, such as meaning, belief and so on. The first point concerns the concept of truth itself; while the second one deals with the functions that the concept of truth has, which we call as “truth practices”. From these two different perspectives, I find that there is a tension between Davidson’s attitudes towards truth and truth practices and his specific ways of explaining truth practices. At one point, he thinks that truth is transcendental and translinguistic and that truth practices are empirical; at the other point, he uses his specific explanations of truth practices, such as his truth-conditional theory of meaning, to criticize other concrete explanations of truth practices, such as the use theory of meaning. However, truth practices are empirical, which means that our understandings of truth practices are not necessary to be the same. That is to say, it is possible that we have different ways to explain truth practices. === Hope to see you there! The LIRa team

1 0

LogiCIC Workshop Call for Papers: Reasoning in Social Context
by LIRa Seminar 06 Oct '15

06 Oct '15

The fourth LogiCIC workshop on Reasoning in Social Context will take place in Amsterdam on November 26-28, 2015. https://logicicworkshop2015.wordpress.com/welcome/ About The Workshop: Via this workshop, we are creating a forum to exchange ideas and explore new territory in which it is clear that logic can make a difference. We are particularly interested in the interplay between logic and the social sciences, i.e. both in studying complex social-epistemic scenarios as well as in the logical tools and techniques that can be used to model them. We approach the theme of this workshop from an interdisciplinary angle, and welcome any insights on to the topic coming from areas such as Logic, Game Theory, Belief Revision Theory, Formal Epistemology, Social Science, Cognitive Science and AI (multi-agent systems). The focus of this workshop includes (but is not restricted to) the following topics: - formal representations of higher-order belief and knowledge – belief revision strategies and knowledge update rules - epistemic and doxastic influence - information flow in social networks - rational interaction - epistemic planning The List of Speakers Includes: Baltag, Alexandru (University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands); Bolander, Thomas (Technical University of Denmark, Copenhagen, Denmark); Seligman, Jeremy (University of Auckland, New Zealand); Smets, Sonja (University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands); Zollman, Kevin (Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA); Eijck, Jan van (CWI, The Netherlands); Rafiee Rad, Soroush (University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands); Kelly, Kevin T. (Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA); Grossi, Davide (University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK); Pigozzi, Gabriella (Université Paris-Dauphine, Paris, France); Perović, Slobodan (University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia). Call For Papers: Participants who are interested in presenting their work at the workshop are welcome to submit a 2-page abstract by 7 November 2015 (Central European Time). Submitted abstracts have to be uploaded on the following easychair site: https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=logicic15. Notifications of acceptance will be sent out by 11 November 2015. Local Organizers: Smets, Sonja (The Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands) And the LogiCIC team members Zoé Christoff, Paolo Galeazzi and Soroush Rafiee Rad (UvA, The Netherlands) Organizational Assistance: Rossel, Pam (The Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands) **** This workshop is the fourth event in the series of LogiCIC workshops in Amsterdam: https://logicicworkshop2015.wordpress.com/welcome/ The workshop is sponsored by the LogiCIC project (ERC-2011-STG No. 283963), on 'The Logical Structure of Correlated Information Change' funded by the European Research Council and the European Community under FP7. ****

1 0

Next Thursday: LIRa session with Yibin Dai.
by LIRa Seminar 02 Oct '15

02 Oct '15

Dear all, next Thursday we will have a LIRa session with Yibin Dai. === Date: Thursday, 8th of October 2015 Time: 15:30 - 17:30 Venue: ILLC Seminar room F1.15, Science Park 107, Amsterdam Speaker: Yibin Dai Title: Truth and truth practices: An investigation of Davidson’s theory of truth. Abstract. As for the concept of truth, although Davidson’s ideas don’t remain stable, his two main points of view keep same: first, that the concept of truth is undefinable; second, that truth is substantial, which, according to Davidson, means that truth is closely related to other concepts, such as meaning, belief and so on. The first point concerns the concept of truth itself; while the second one deals with the functions that the concept of truth has, which we call as “truth practices”. From these two different perspectives, I find that there is a tension between Davidson’s attitudes towards truth and truth practices and his specific ways of explaining truth practices. At one point, he thinks that truth is transcendental and translinguistic and that truth practices are empirical; at the other point, he uses his specific explanations of truth practices, such as his truth-conditional theory of meaning, to criticize other concrete explanations of truth practices, such as the use theory of meaning. However, truth practices are empirical, which means that our understandings of truth practices are not necessary to be the same. That is to say, it is possible that we have different ways to explain truth practices. === Hope to see you there! The LIRa team -- More information on the LIRa seminar: https://www.illc.uva.nl/lgc/seminar You are receiving this email because you have subscribed to the LIRa announcements. To unsubscribe or change your email address, please use this link: to https://list.uva.nl/mailman/listinfo/illc-lira

1 0

Jump to page:

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

ILLC-LIRa