Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 9 June 16:30.
Please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09
(Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Krisztina Fruzsa (TU Wien)
Date and Time: Thursday, June 9th 2022, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam
time.
Venue: online.
Title: New hope for epistemic reasoning in byzantine fault-tolerant
distributed systems.
Abstract. The epistemic approach to the study of various models of
distributed systems has shown to be fruitful over the last three
decades. In this talk, I will present some of the results in the area
w.r.t. the byzantine fault-tolerant model. By extending Fagin et
al.’s classic runs-and-systems framework, we have developed a
comprehensive framework that also allows modelling misbehaviours of
byzantine agents. In this extended framework, we prove the so-called
Brain-in-a-Vat Lemma (formalizing the brain-in-a-vat scenario), one of
our central results. In this talk we will take a closer look at this
result to see how using its various knowledge limitations can be
represented in the logical language. We will also take a look at some
of our most recent results on the topic, one of them being an
alternative axiomatization of the so-called hope modality that has
been introduced in the context of epistemic analysis of byzantine
fault-tolerant systems. We will see that, essentially, hope can be
described using a standard KB4_n system. We will also see how we can
combine KB4_n hope modalities with S5_n knowledge modalities in a
joint logic enriched with both common hope and common knowledge.
Interestingly, in the corresponding logics some of the main properties
of the above-mentioned systems such as the bound on the maximal number
of byzantine faulty agents and the brain-in-a-vat related properties
become frame-characterizable.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, 9 June 16:30.
Please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09
(Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Krisztina Fruzsa (TU Wien)
Date and Time: Thursday, June 9th 2022, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam
time.
Venue: online.
Title: New hope for epistemic reasoning in byzantine fault-tolerant
distributed systems.
Abstract. The epistemic approach to the study of various models of
distributed systems has shown to be fruitful over the last three
decades. In this talk, I will present some of the results in the area
w.r.t. the byzantine fault-tolerant model. By extending Fagin et
al.’s classic runs-and-systems framework, we have developed a
comprehensive framework that also allows modelling misbehaviours of
byzantine agents. In this extended framework, we prove the so-called
Brain-in-a-Vat Lemma (formalizing the brain-in-a-vat scenario), one of
our central results. In this talk we will take a closer look at this
result to see how using its various knowledge limitations can be
represented in the logical language. We will also take a look at some
of our most recent results on the topic, one of them being an
alternative axiomatization of the so-called hope modality that has
been introduced in the context of epistemic analysis of byzantine
fault-tolerant systems. We will see that, essentially, hope can be
described using a standard KB4_n system. We will also see how we can
combine KB4_n hope modalities with S5_n knowledge modalities in a
joint logic enriched with both common hope and common knowledge.
Interestingly, in the corresponding logics some of the main properties
of the above-mentioned systems such as the bound on the maximal number
of byzantine faulty agents and the brain-in-a-vat related properties
become frame-characterizable.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 2 June 16:30.
Please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09
(Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Gregor Behnke (ILLC, University of Amsterdam)
Date and Time: Thursday, June 2nd 2022, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam
time.
Venue: online.
Title: Planning with Temporally extended Goals
Abstract. Planning asks to find a sequence of actions that will lead
to achieving a given objective. Traditionally, this means that we are
given an initial state (in terms of facts over some function-free
first-order logic), (first-order) actions that can modify the state,
and a goal state. This goal state is described in terms of a set of
facts that we want to achieve simultaneously in the last state after
executing the whole plan. In some scenarios this simple definition of
the objective as a single goal state does not suffice. For example, we
might want to describe that we shall first achieve objective A and
only afterwards B, or that we want to achieve A without ever achieving
B in the mean time. Further one might also want to describe infinite
behaviour, i.e., a plan for running a factory machine indefinitely.
For this purpose, the description of the objective can be formulated
using Temporal Logic -- and are then called "Temporally Extended
Goals".
In the talk, I will give a brief introduction into planning. I will
then turn to the way that temporally extended goals are usually
described in planning and discuss the connection of this description
language with Linear Temporal Logic. Lastly, I will give a brief
overview of the possible ways to integrate Temporally Extended Goals
into the planning process.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, 2 June 16:30.
Please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09
(Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Gregor Behnke (ILLC, University of Amsterdam)
Date and Time: Thursday, June 2nd 2022, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam
time.
Venue: online.
Title: Planning with Temporally extended Goals
Abstract. Planning asks to find a sequence of actions that will lead
to achieving a given objective. Traditionally, this means that we are
given an initial state (in terms of facts over some function-free
first-order logic), (first-order) actions that can modify the state,
and a goal state. This goal state is described in terms of a set of
facts that we want to achieve simultaneously in the last state after
executing the whole plan. In some scenarios this simple definition of
the objective as a single goal state does not suffice. For example, we
might want to describe that we shall first achieve objective A and
only afterwards B, or that we want to achieve A without ever achieving
B in the mean time. Further one might also want to describe infinite
behaviour, i.e., a plan for running a factory machine indefinitely.
For this purpose, the description of the objective can be formulated
using Temporal Logic -- and are then called "Temporally Extended
Goals".
In the talk, I will give a brief introduction into planning. I will
then turn to the way that temporally extended goals are usually
described in planning and discuss the connection of this description
language with Linear Temporal Logic. Lastly, I will give a brief
overview of the possible ways to integrate Temporally Extended Goals
into the planning process.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 19 May
16:30.
Please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09
(Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Paul Egré (École Normale Supérieure)
Date and Time: Thursday, May 19th 2022, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam
time.
Venue: online.
Title: On the optimality of vagueness
Abstract. What is the function of vagueness in language? Vagueness
is often viewed as a deficiency, but it has also been recognized
as a mechanism of prudence and error minimization (Channell 1994,
Krifka 2007, van Deemter 2009). The leading hypothesis in this
paper is that in contexts in which a cooperative speaker is not
perfectly informed about the world, the use of vague expressions
can offer an optimal tradeoff between truthfulness (Gricean
Quality) and informativeness (Gricean Quantity). Focusing on
expressions of approximation such as ``around'', which are
semantically vague, it is shown that they allow the speaker to
convey indirect probabilistic information, in a way that can give
the listener a more accurate representation of the information
available to the speaker than *any* more precise expression would
(intervals of the form ``between''). The paper presents and
develops a probabilistic account of the meaning of "around" to
substantiate this hypothesis, in the wake of recent work done in
the field of Bayesian pragmatics (Lassiter and Goodman 2017,
Goodman and Stuhlmüller 2013). I will discuss some philosophical
implications of the account, in particular to revisit a debate
between C. Wright and T. Williamson regarding the epistemic
conception of approximation expressions such as "around" and of
vague expressions more broadly (Wright 1995).
Joint work with Benjamin Spector, Adele Mortier, Steven Verheyen.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, 19 May 16:30.
Please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09
(Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Paul Egré (École Normale Supérieure)
Date and Time: Thursday, May 19th 2022, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam
time.
Venue: online.
Title: On the optimality of vagueness
Abstract. What is the function of vagueness in language? Vagueness
is
often viewed as a deficiency, but it has also been recognized as a
mechanism of prudence and error minimization (Channell 1994,
Krifka
2007, van Deemter 2009). The leading hypothesis in this paper is
that
in contexts in which a cooperative speaker is not perfectly
informed
about the world, the use of vague expressions can offer an optimal
tradeoff between truthfulness (Gricean Quality) and
informativeness
(Gricean Quantity). Focusing on expressions of approximation such
as
``around'', which are semantically vague, it is shown that they
allow
the speaker to convey indirect probabilistic information, in a way
that can give the listener a more accurate representation of the
information available to the speaker than *any* more precise
expression would (intervals of the form ``between''). The paper
presents and develops a probabilistic account of the meaning of
"around" to substantiate this hypothesis, in the wake of recent
work
done in the field of Bayesian pragmatics (Lassiter and Goodman
2017,
Goodman and Stuhlmüller 2013). I will discuss some philosophical
implications of the account, in particular to revisit a debate
between
C. Wright and T. Williamson regarding the epistemic conception of
approximation expressions such as "around" and of vague
expressions
more broadly (Wright 1995).
Joint work with Benjamin Spector, Adele Mortier, Steven Verheyen.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We would like to draw your attention to the following event which might also be interesting for the LIRa audience.
kind regards,
the LIRa team
----
*Logic at Large Lecture 2022*
The Dutch Association for Logic and Philosophy of the Exact Sciences
(VvL) is happy to announce the Logic at Large Lecture 2022 aimed at
a general audience.
It will take place on *31 May 2022* (16:00-19:00).
We are pleased to announce that Professor *Joel David Hamkins*
(University of Notre Dame) will give a public lecture entitled
"Infinite Games, Frivolities of the Gods" (see abstract below).
The event will take place online using Zoom and will be concluded
by a social gathering on the virtual platform Gather.Town.
Registration is free, but necessary to receive links to Zoom and
Gather.Town. For registration and more information, please visit:
https://verenigingvoorlogica.nl/en/Activiteiten/VvL-Logic-at-Large-Lectures/
*Programme*:
16:00-16:30 Virtual arrival and informal discussions
16:30-18:00 Public lecture by Joel D. Hamkins (Notre Dame University) including discussion
18:00-19:00 Social Event on Gather.town
Speaker: Joel David Hamkins (University of Notre Dame)
Title: "Infinite Games, Frivolities of the Gods"
Abstract: Many familiar finite games admit natural infinitary analogues, which often highlight intriguing issues in infinite game theory. Shall we have a game of infinite chess? Or how about infinite draughts, infinite Hex, infinite Go, infinite Wordle, or infinite Sudoku? Let me introduce these games and use them to illustrate various fascinating concepts in the theory of infinite games.
----
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 12 May 16:30.
Please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09
(Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Rineke Verbrugge (University of Groningen)
Date and Time: Thursday, May 12th 2022, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam
time.
Venue: online.
Title: Effectiveness of higher-order theory of mind in competitive,
cooperative and mixed-motive situations
Abstract. When engaging in intelligent interaction, people rely on
their ability to reason about other people's mental states,
including goals, intentions, and beliefs. This theory of mind ability
allows them to more easily understand, predict, and manipulate the
behavior of others. People can use their theory of mind recursively,
which allows them to understand second-order attributions such as
"Alice believes that Bob does not know that she wrote a novel under
pseudonym". This ability is unique to humans: animals may or may not
exhibit some forms of first-order theory of mind, but definitely no
higher orders.
Using agent-based modeling, Harmen de Weerd, Bart Verheij and I have
shown that higher-order theory of mind reasoning can be useful across
competitive, cooperative, and mixed-motive settings. In this lecture,
we discuss these results and we cast a new light on mixed-motive
situations by investigating how the predictability of the environment
influences the effectiveness of higher-order theory of mind. Our
results show that the benefit of higher-order theory of mind reasoning
depends on the predictability of the environment. We consider
agent-based simulations in repeated one-shot negotiations in the
negotiation game 'Colored Trails'. When this environment is highly
predictable, agents obtain little benefit from theory of mind
reasoning. However, if the environment has more observable features
that change over time, agents without the ability to use theory of
mind experience more difficulties predicting the behavior of others
accurately. This in turn allows theory of mind agents to obtain higher
scores in these more dynamic environments. These results suggest that
the human-specific ability for higher-order theory of mind reasoning
may have evolved to allow us to survive in more complex and
unpredictable environments.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session on Thursday, 12 May 16:30.
Please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09
(Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Rineke Verbrugge (University of Groningen)
Date and Time: Thursday, May 12th 2022, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam
time.
Venue: online.
Title: Effectiveness of higher-order theory of mind in competitive, cooperative and mixed-motive situations
Abstract. When engaging in intelligent interaction, people rely on
their ability to reason about other people’s mental states,
including goals, intentions, and beliefs. This theory of mind ability
allows them to more easily understand, predict, and manipulate the
behavior of others. People can use their theory of mind recursively,
which allows them to understand second-order attributions such as
“Alice believes that Bob does not know that she wrote a novel under
pseudonym”. This ability is unique to humans: animals may or may not
exhibit some forms of first-order theory of mind, but definitely no
higher orders.
Using agent-based modeling, Harmen de Weerd, Bart Verheij and I have
shown that higher-order theory of mind reasoning can be useful across
competitive, cooperative, and mixed-motive settings. In this lecture,
we discuss these results and we cast a new light on mixed-motive
situations by investigating how the predictability of the environment
influences the effectiveness of higher-order theory of mind. Our
results show that the benefit of higher-order theory of mind reasoning
depends on the predictability of the environment. We consider
agent-based simulations in repeated one-shot negotiations in the
negotiation game 'Colored Trails'. When this environment is highly
predictable, agents obtain little benefit from theory of mind
reasoning. However, if the environment has more observable features
that change over time, agents without the ability to use theory of
mind experience more difficulties predicting the behavior of others
accurately. This in turn allows theory of mind agents to obtain higher
scores in these more dynamic environments. These results suggest that
the human-specific ability for higher-order theory of mind reasoning
may have evolved to allow us to survive in more complex and
unpredictable environments.
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team
Dear all,
We will have our next LIRa session tomorrow, on Thursday, 28 April 16:30.
Please use our recurring zoom link:
https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/88142993494?pwd=d1BsQWR4T2UyK0Job29YNThjaGRkUT09
(Meeting ID: 881 4299 3494, Passcode: 352984)
You can find the details of the talk below.
Speaker: Marianna Girlando (University of Birmingham)
Date and Time: Thursday, April 28th 2022, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam
time.
Venue: online.
Title: Counterfactuals, comparative plausibility and neighbourhoods:
from semantics to automated theorem proving.
Abstract. Conditional logics can be used to express counterfactuals
(Lewis) or forms of non-monotonic reasoning (Burgess). They are
defined by adding to classical propositional logic a two-places
modality, the conditional operator. Semantics for conditional logics
can be uniformly defined in terms of neighbourhood semantics,
generalising Lewis' sphere models. In this talk, I will show the
relations between the conditional operator and a weaker modal
operator, the comparative plausibility, that I will use to define
analytic proof systems for some of the stronger logics in the
conditional family. Then, I will illustrate how these proof systems
can be implemented to design automated reasoning tools for conditional
logics.
This talk is based on joint work with Bjoern Lellmann, Nicola
Olivetti, Gian Luca Pozzato and Stefano Pesce.
The theorem prover is available here:
http://193.51.60.97:8000/tuclever/
Hope to see you there!
The LIRa team